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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on the propensity to 
start a family. Unemployment is accompanied by bad occupational prospects 
and  impending  economic  deprivation,  placing  the  well-being  of  a  future 
family  at  risk.  I  analyze  unemployment  at  the  intersection  of  state-
dependence and the reduced opportunity costs of parenthood, distinguishing 
between men and women across a set of welfare states. Using micro-data 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), I apply event his-
tory  methods  to  analyze  longitudinal  samples  of  first-birth  transitions  in 
France, Finland, Germany, and the UK (1994-2001). The results highlight 
spurious negative effects of unemployment on family formation among men, 
which can be attributed to the lack of breadwinner capabilities in the inabil-
ity to financially support a family. Women, in contrast, show positive effects 
of unemployment on the propensity to have a first child in all countries ex-
cept France. These effects prevail even after controlling for labour market 
and income-related factors. The findings are pronounced in Germany and 
the UK where work-family conflicts are the cause of high opportunity costs 
of motherhood, and the gender-specific division of labour is still highly tra-
ditional. Particularly among women with a moderate and low level of educa-
tion, unemployment clearly increases the likelihood to have a first child. 
Keywords: family formation, fertility, unemployment, cross-national com-
parison. 2                                                                      
 
1)    Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of unemployment on fertility behaviour at the 
individual level. This issue is rooted on the one hand in conflicts over the limited time avail-
able for parenthood (both time in everyday life, and time within the lifetime), and on the 
other, in the economic requirements for supporting a family and thus fulfilling breadwinner 
responsibilities. Unemployment is one manifestation of precarious employment patterns (see 
Kreyenfeld 2000; Kurz, Steinhage & Golsch 2001; Tölke & Diewald 2003). Moreover, it ex-
acerbates  economic  deprivation,  particularly  in  young  families  (see  Beaujot  &  Liu  2002; 
D´Ambrosio & Grandin 2003, Finch & Bradshaw 2003, Jenkins, Schluter & Wagner 2003). 
The individual experience of an unemployment episode bears a series of consequences, 
some of which hamper family formation, while some foster the transition to parenthood. Un-
employment reduces the opportunity costs of a fertility transition by providing time for child-
rearing, an otherwise scarce commodity when trying to combine work and family. Moreover, 
family formation might compensate for the loss in social status, particularly in social contexts 
where having children is highly valued (see generally Leibenstein 1975). In contrast, unem-
ployment undermines the economic foundations for a future family. Long-term commitments 
like parenthood are at risk when the individual’s future ability to financially support a family 
is in question. Longer spells of unemployment or absence from the labour market may fur-
thermore devalue human capital investments and may seriously hamper the chance of return-
ing to the labour force, thus consolidating economic dependence. Hence, a return to the labour 
market might – under certain conditions – be the first choice over family formation.  
Theoretical considerations as well as previous empirical research dealing with the impact 
of precarious employment situations on fertility suggest that such factors are unlikely to affect 
both genders in similar ways (see Oppenheimer 1994; Kurz et al. 2001; Tölke & Diewald 
2003; Golsch 2004; Kreyenfeld 2005; Tölke 2005). Hence, these rational choice based consi-
derations and previous research findings will be addressed in detail in the following sections. 
In investigating a possible connection between unemployment and family formation, the focus 
of analysis remains on two major research questions:  
￿   First, do unemployed persons have a significantly different likelihood of entering parent-
hood than persons with continuous employment careers?                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             3 
 
￿   Second, is there a gender-specific difference in the effect of unemployment on the transi-
tion to parenthood?  
Institutional regulations play central mediating roles in the gender-specific rationales for fam-
ily formation during times of unemployment. The economic endowments of families, the abil-
ity to combine work and family, and predominant gender role ascriptions are closely related to 
welfare state regulations (see DiPrete, Morgan, Engelhardt & Pacalova 2003; Neyer 2003). 
An investigation of the unemployment-related effects on the family formation process must 
therefore consider the role of such institutional arrangements. The methodological approach 
of this paper includes a cross-national comparison of four countries: Finland, France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom, each representing a specific welfare state orientation. The 
empirical models are based on longitudinal analysis of micro-data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP), facilitating event history methods.  
2)    Unemployment and the Transition to Parenthood – 
       Previous Findings 
Individual Unemployment 
There are several studies that focus on the relation between labour market performance and 
family formation at the micro level. Most of these do not explicitly focus on unemployment 
but consider it an indicator of occupational performance. Moreover, most studies refer to spe-
cific populations on a national or sub-national level. Liefbroer and Corjin, e.g. (1999) find in 
an analysis of Dutch and Flemish young adults that unemployment hampers family formation 
among men but significantly promotes the rate of entry into parenthood for women. With a 
focus on the relation between education, occupational hardships, and the transition to first 
motherhood in Sweden between 1986 to 1997, Hoem (2000) identifies particularly low birth 
rates among students, but no distinct effects in cases of unemployment. Andersson (2000), 
however, points to findings suggesting a positive effect of unemployment on first-birth risk, at 
least among Swedish women between 20 and 30. In a study examining the fertility conse-
quences of unemployment, Kravdal (2002) utilises Norwegian register data for both men and 4                                                                      
 
women. According to this study, the transition rate to second and higher-order births is dimin-
ished by unemployment episodes, while in contrast a weak positive effect exists for the transi-
tion to first motherhood. Among men, his findings point to a dominant negative effect of un-
employment with respect to all birth parities. The set of covariates in this study is very lim-
ited, however, and also excludes wages. In line with the above results, Vikat provides findings 
for Finland (2004) that display a weak correlation between unemployment and individual fer-
tility, particularly among women younger than 30.  
In the case of Germany, Kurz, Steinhage, and Golsch (2001) find the aforementioned gen-
der-specific opposite effects, with a higher likelihood for unemployed women to start a family 
and a slightly lower likelihood for unemployed men. Tölke and Diewald (2003), who focus on 
the transition to fatherhood in the context of precarious employment, also recognize a nega-
tive impact of unemployment. Witte and Wagner (1995) also investigate the effect of em-
ployment status on the transition to fatherhood, distinguishing between transitions in East and 
West in post-unification Germany. Although theoretically arguing that occupational insecuri-
ties should hamper breadwinner qualities, they do not find any clear evidence in that direc-
tion. Kreyenfeld also distinguishes between East and West Germany in her analysis (2000), 
and among different durations of unemployment. She cites a pronounced increase of entry 
into motherhood beyond short-term unemployment, as well as for all women with lower levels 
of academic education. In another approach, which focuses on labour market related insecuri-
ties, Huinink and Kreyenfeld (2004) examine the first-birth risks of two East German cohorts. 
The authors point out that an immediate effect of unemployment on family formation is evi-
dent, but note that “employment uncertainties do not generally contribute to a postponement 
of fertility” (Huinink & Kreyenfeld 2004: 28).  
The majority of the presented studies focuses on female fertility transitions from unem-
ployment (except for Tölke & Diewald 2003, e.g.), while only the studies by Kreyenfeld for 
Germany (2001) and by Kravdal for Norway (2002) control for any effects of unemployment 
duration. Moreover, all of the studies mentioned focus on a country specific context. The only 
investigation that makes use of cross-national comparative data for the analysis of first-birth 
transitions for both men and women is provided by Golsch (2004). Using ECHP data from 
Germany, the UK and Spain for her analysis, she identifies significant effects of unemploy-
ment only among Spanish men, for whom the impact is distinctively negative. The current                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             5 
 
project aims to expand this view to explore the effects of unemployment on the transition to 
parenthood among both men and women in a cross-national comparison of France, Finland, 
Germany, and the UK. By doing so, I will also control for the impact of several partner char-
acteristics and for the impact of unemployment duration. 
Aggregate Unemployment 
An additional group of studies focuses on the impact of unemployment rate on individual fer-
tility decisions. Generally, high unemployment is assumed to exert a pronounced negative ef-
fect on fertility. Adsera (2005) stresses this finding for a set of European countries based on 
ECHP data, and Klein and colleagues (1996) provide similar findings for East Germany
1. 
Kravdal (2002), for Norway also stresses the depressive effect of high unemployment rates on 
fertility (considering only aggregate fertility, however). The assumed mechanism at work is 
that high unemployment signals bleak labour market prospects and the resulting occupational 
insecurities offer an unpromising outlook for starting a family. Thus, couples tend to focus on 
occupational attainment in order to contain these risks, which fosters a deferral of childbear-
ing decisions (see Kohler, Billari & Ortega 2002: 659; Vikat 2002: 174; Aaberge, Colombino, 
Del Boca, Ermisch, Francesconi, Pasqua & Strøm 2005: 132). This reasoning is in line with a 
research tradition initiated by Easterlin (1962; 1966) and Butz and Ward (1979), which as-
sumes that fertility behaviour is oriented on anticipation of (macro-) economic conditions.  
However, it has already been pointed out that such macro-level correlates are no reliable 
indicators when attempting to unravel the underlying mechanisms at work. Two topics are of 
special relevance in this context: 1) It remains unclear through which mechanisms such objec-
tive indicators as unpromising economic prospects translate into individual perceptions, and 
2) Once these perceptions are established, it is unclear how individual perceptions of eco-
nomic uncertainty affect fertility behaviour. The following investigation will focus primarily 
on micro-level effects of individual unemployment and thus address the second of these ques-
tions with respect to tangible experiences of economic insecurity and their impact on fertility 
behaviour. Through a cross-national comparison, this section will attempt to clarify the im-
 
                                                            
 
1   The study presents some evidence that individual unemployment interacts with a high unemployment rate. In 
this context, the authors stress that a high unemployment rate tended to foster the transition to motherhood in 
East Germany shortly after German reunification (see Klein et al. 1996: 75).  6                                                                      
 
pact of different welfare systems and labour market conditions on individual fertility deci-
sions. 
3)    Fertility Decisions under Unemployment –  
       Theoretical Considerations 
This section will outline theoretical key issues and apply them to an investigation of how in-
dividual experience of unemployment alters family formation rationales. In this context, the 
negative consequences that attend job loss – the loss of earnings, a decline in social status, a 
depreciation of human capital investments and insecure future prospects – are all likely to ex-
ert a specific (not necessarily univocal) impact on the choice to start a family. 
Work and Family as Competing Domains in the Life Course – Initial Considerations 
This section begins with the assumption that the desire to have children is a common and 
widespread life-goal in modern societies (see Huinink 2001: 3). Family formation, like par-
ticipation in gainful employment and investment in a career, provides social approval and 
physical well-being, through acquiring comfort and stimulation (through the joy of watching a 
child grow up, for example, or by earning the monetary resources for consumption). From the 
perspective of social production functions, family formation and gainful employment both 
represent competing options for attaining these universal life-goals (see Lindenberg 1986; 
1991). Still, the desire to have a child is often based on immanent values, so pursuing alterna-
tive  goals  can  only  provide  a  limited  substitute  for  the  satisfaction  of  these  desires  (see 
Schoen, Kim, Nathanson, Fields & Astone 1997: 335). In any case, starting a family requires 
financial resources and economic security (see Oppenheimer 1994).  
The above picture addresses two central points: First, becoming a parent and investing in a 
career are choices that compete for a limited time budget. Second, starting a family generally 
relies on a sound and stable economic basis, which is provided by gainful employment. A 
widespread response to these constraints is to either combine work and parenthood by reduc-
ing individual expenditure in both domains (and by activating social support networks where 
possible). The alternate is to arrange labour market engagement and parenthood sequentially                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             7 
 
within the course of an individual biography, that is, to postpone the first-birth transition (see 
Dornseiff & Sackmann 2003). 
When unemployment enters into the situation as an unexpected labour market event,
2 it 
fundamentally alters the context outlined above. The economic support of a future family is 
placed on uncertain ground; the opportunity costs of parenthood are drastically diminished, 
while human capital investment tends to deteriorate with duration of labour market absence. 
At the same time, having a child presents an alternative means of gaining social approval. The 
question, which of these mechanisms eventually dominate, and lead either to a hastening or a 
postponement of parenthood under unemployment, must be answered with a close focus on 
the  societal  context  of  social  structures  and  institutional  arrangements  (see  DiPrete  & 
McManus 2000). Most of the factors that effect the relation between family formation and 
unemployment differ in their impact on men and women as well as across countries. The fam-
ily formation rationales related to these contexts will be discussed theoretically in the follow-
ing section. 
A Gender Perspective on Unemployment and Family Formation 
Interpreting the wages of female workers as an indicator of the value of women’s time, unem-
ployment or bleak labour market prospects reduce the price of time, thus reducing the oppor-
tunity costs of parenthood (see Leibenstein 1975). A specialisation on household production 
of commodities in this context would be a reasonable response to unemployment (see Becker 
1993). However, this is highly dependent on predominant models of gender division of labour 
in a society, which range from egalitarian to traditional roles. Neoclassical models, which 
commonly assume traditional gender roles, envisage a complementary division of occupa-
tional and domestic tasks, divided along gender lines. From this perspective, female unem-
ployment should speed up family formation, while male unemployment should delay 
family formation (see Zimmermann & DeNew 1990). Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa 
(1994) similarly argue that – assuming traditional gender roles – women in a discouraging 
 
                                                            
 
2   In fact, some actors may deliberately plan their labour market exit prior to family formation. However, the na-
ture of most welfare state transfers, in particular, reinstatement rights after parental leave and the fact that un-
employment support only partially replaces former income renders this an unlikely choice under most welfare 
state arrangements. 8                                                                      
 
employment situation are more likely to opt for motherhood, taking into account not only their 
current situation, but also the unpromising labour market prospects. 
From a theoretical perspective that also takes into account egalitarian gender roles, female 
unemployment would still reduce the opportunity costs of parenthood in contexts where both 
partners are integrated into the labour market. Even in societies that tend towards high levels 
of gender egalitarianism, female engagement in childcare exceeds male contributions. If the 
time-intensive transition to parenthood is placed within a period of unemployment, forgone 
earnings are still minimized and time conflicts are cushioned for couples with egalitarian gen-
der roles. However, it should be noted that where parental burdens are more equally distrib-
uted between men and woman, female opportunity costs are lower, and hence the incentive to 
further reduce these costs by placing the transition to parenthood within an unemployment 
episode should be less pronounced. 
In the case of male unemployment, there is a limit to how much family formation can be 
combined with the father taking over the bulk of parental responsibilities, since some of the 
maternal burdens associated with having a child like childbearing, giving birth and nursing, 
are unalienable. Indeed, the transition to parenthood always requires that the mother take at 
least a temporary absence from the labour market. Welfare state income replacements and re-
instatement rights after a maternal leave offer limited compensation for this absence (see pp. 
26ff.). However, in cases where the man is unemployed and the woman is the sole income 
earner, her temporary exit from the labour market most likely conflicts with the need to main-
tain the economic stability and autonomy of the couple. Evidence, particularly from the US, 
indicates that childbirth-related absences from the labour market can be fairly short
3 and a 
quick return of the female to her job can be compensated for if the man adopts a larger share 
of the parental obligations (those that are distributable). This reversal of traditional roles, 
however, involves wide deviations from common gender norms and is perhaps most likely in 
institutional contexts where maternity protection is underdeveloped anyway, as in the liberal 
welfare state. Summarizing the above, starting a family with a female wage earner and a 
male carer poses an unlikely constellation. 
 
                                                            
 
3   However, it can be argued that the prevalent quick job return postpartum is rather due to an underdeveloped 
maternity protection and economic needs in liberal welfare states than to close labour market attachment.                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             9 
 
The conclusion of this initial frame of reference suggests that there are gender-specific ef-
fects of unemployment. Thus, unemployment can be seen as an exogenous effect that, in the 
context of a pending transition to parenthood, has different implications for family formation 
decisions when either the man or the woman becomes unemployed. For both partners, indi-
vidual unemployment directly reduces available household income. Moreover, for both men 
and women unemployment indirectly reduces the obtainable market income by diminishing 
human capital with the increasing duration of the unemployment spell. What applies particu-
larly in case of female unemployment is a reduction in the cost of time required for child-
care (whereas the original cost of parenthood depends on the availability of public childcare). 
If a couple displays more egalitarian gender role attitudes, resulting in male engagement in 
childcare,  the  reduced  price  of  time  would  also  apply  to  male  unemployment.  As shown 
above, however, parenthood in case of male unemployment would require that the female 
temporarily reduces her activity in the labour market, and so this appears an unlikely case 
where the male earner is already without a job. Furthermore, judging from the limited paternal 
engagement with childrearing in virtually all Western societies (see Fuwa 2004), women can 
anticipate that they would still have to expend significant effort in childcare, making family 
formation during male unemployment an even more unlikely scenario. In this sense, male un-
employment is more likely to function primarily as a signal of reduced breadwinner capa-
bilities, thus decreasing the likelihood of family formation (see Oppenheimer 1994: 322). 
Unemployment and Biographical Uncertainties 
With respect to family formation, unemployment directly hampers the creation of a solid eco-
nomic basis, but it also increases future risks by depreciating human capital, entailing perma-
nent losses in earnings (see Gangl 2006) and by nourishing doubts about the future capability 
to support a family. Unless unemployment is willingly entered into with a new occupational 
perspective up one’s sleeve, becoming unemployed signals uncertain future prospects, put-
ting family formation on a precarious basis. Issues that contribute to this uncertainty about the 
future include: the possibility of having to move to take a new job, uncertainty about whether 
the new occupation will have adequate or the same occupational status as the previous posi-
tion, whether wage expectations will be met or whether some loss in income must be ac-
cepted. All these issues and, last but not least, not knowing when an appropriate job will be-
come available, increase uncertainty about the future. Such uncertainties are likely to hamper 10                                                                      
 
family formation plans, where they undermine the stability and economic foundation of a fu-
ture family. Importantly, most of these contexts and prospects associated with unemployment 
related uncertainties tend to worsen with unemployment duration.
4 Moreover, these un-
certainties are also mediated by educational attainment; higher education is associated with 
better chances to regain a job quickly, but also a higher threat of depreciated skill endow-
ments. 
Furthermore, the institutional setting also mediates the perception of risks during un-
employment. On one hand, different welfare states might provide different levels of protec-
tion from unemployment. On the other, this same social protection might affect attitudes to-
ward risk, whereby a higher level of protection perhaps induces a more rigid assessment of 
which contexts are deemed sufficiently reliable for family formation. Employer-firm relations 
in coordinated market economies, characterized by high levels of trust, indicate reliability and 
long-term relations, what might further nurture the avoidance of uncertainty. That is, in socie-
ties that provide a high level of protection from unemployment by minimizing risk incidence,
5 
the actual experience of unemployment might present a much more severe experience of inse-
curity than is the case in societies where labour market entries and exits are common events, 
as in liberal market economies. In a society that relies on a high level of social protection and 
that aims to minimize risk, an internalised uncertainty avoidance might make family forma-
tion in a precarious occupational context an unpromising biographical option. Yet, it should 
be noted that a strong economic position or the thorough labour market integration of the 
other partner could contain the negative impact of unemployment related uncertainty.  
Unemployment and the Depreciation of Human Capital 
Becoming unemployed represents a more pronounced change in status for people with higher 
levels of education, for whom individual aspirations and comparison with reference groups 
will likely render unemployment a more drastic experience than for low skilled professionals. 
A higher level of education and vocational skills translate into a higher earning capacity and 
increased career options. Moreover, human capital endowments tend to deteriorate with 
 
                                                            
 
4   This is an even greater issue where institutional unemployment support is reduced after a certain time in most 
welfare states (see pp. 26ff.). 
5   For instance, by enacting legal protection of employees, and by encouraging long-term employee-firm relations 
(see Hall & Soskice 2001; DiPrete 2002).                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             11 
 
duration of labour market absence (see Mincer & Polachek 1974; Mincer & Ofek 1982). 
“The longer a woman would be out of the labour force, the greater a loss she would incur in 
terms of skill degradation and lost opportunities (for promoting and training)...” (Gauthier & 
Hatzius 1997: 296). In the case of highly skilled unemployed women, reintegration into the 
labour market is also favourable in order to avoid the consolidation of the homemaker role 
and the associated risk of economic dependence (see Ott 1995). Thus, for persons who have 
made extensive skill investments, and for higher educated women in particular, it is rational to 
postpone family formation and instead promote a labour market reintegration (see Brewster & 
Rindfuss 2000: 281; Tölke 2004: 25). 
However, the costs of deteriorating human capital when facing unemployment (and thus the 
expected decline in both future earnings and career options) are opposed to significantly de-
creased opportunity costs of starting a family. Among women with a higher income capacity, 
this decline in opportunity costs is particularly pronounced (see Lundberg & Pollak 2007: 18). 
An important question in this context is whether the decreased opportunity costs of childbirth 
during unemployment outmatch the urge to avoid a depreciation of human capital and thus to 
re-enter the labour market. Two issues are critical in this context:  
1) The actors’ assessment of the costs of remaining unemployed and the costs of parent-
hood are mediated by institutional contexts (see DiPrete & McManus 2000: 344f.). This is the 
case, for example, where transfers partially compensate for income loss in case of unemploy-
ment or where the infrastructure for childcare permits the time required for childcare to be re-
duced, thus lowering the opportunity costs of parenthood. 
2) The duration of the unemployment episode is likely to influence whether the individuals 
favour family formation or labour market re-entry. While actors will try to avoid an ongoing 
deterioration of skill endowments, the confidence that one can quickly regain a job is likely to 
decrease over time. 
An analytic consideration of how unemployment duration effects the likelihood to opt for 
having a child is provided by Happel, Hill and Low (1984). According to their theoretical 
model, decisions in favour of birth are made in cases where the negative impact of the dura-
tion of the woman’s unemployment offsets the amount of her accumulated human capital. 
However, the anticipated depreciation of the human capital is further mediated by the assess-
ment of the current labour market situation, the perceived chances of regaining a job quickly, 12                                                                      
 
and how current job options compare to those expected after a childbirth-related leave. While 
unemployment rates are an indication of occupational prospects (see Aaberge et al. 2005: 
132), more generally the type of market coordination affects the permeability of labour mar-
kets, thus influencing the chances to re-enter the labour market (see Hall & Soskice 2001). 
The perception of bleak job prospects can speed up the transition to motherhood. This might 
be the case if attempts to regain a job remain unsuccessful over a long period of time, leading 
to a sense of resignation, or if a labour market crisis and recession indicate that ew employ-
ment opportunities are rare. For men, however, one would expect the likelihood of starting a 
family to be generally reduced from the perspective of depreciating human capital endow-
ments, which tends to signal a decline in potential income, and thus in breadwinner capabili-
ties. 
In summary, the depreciation of human capital exerts a negative impact on the transi-
tion to parenthood for both men and women. However, the high opportunity costs of par-
enthood may outmatch the depreciation, particularly among women with a lower skill set. 
Among men, on the other hand, with their generally lower engagement in childcare, skill loss 
primarily signals a decline in the ability to provide a sustaining source of income. Among 
women with a higher level of education, the institutionally mediated opportunity costs of par-
enthood and the duration of unemployment (associated with potential discouragement and de-
creased chances of quickly regaining a job) are likely to be weighed against each other. 
Family Formation from Unemployment and Bargaining Position 
Unemployment – particularly if it is of longer duration – does not only depreciate human 
capital investments. It also shifts the bargaining power within couples to the detriment of the 
one who is unemployed, since bargaining power relies on labour market status and educa-
tional achievements (see Ott 1995; Beblo 2001: 23). As unemployment tends to weaken the 
individual’s bargaining position, two main conclusions can be established. 1) The partner with 
the superior income position (usually the one who is still employed, assuming both partners 
were previously working) can better voice his individual preferences, particularly his child-
bearing preferences (see generally Bielby & Bielby 1992: 1244). Furthermore, female unem-
ployment in particular will likely result in a more traditional division of labour within the 
couple, with the woman assuming a higher proportion of household chores. That is, the divi-
sion of labour already tends towards what is likely going to be the status quo throughout par-                  Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             13 
 
enthood. 2) In order to avoid economic dependence and to improve his bargaining position, 
the unemployed partner will likely try to regain a job. This dynamic is mediated by the wel-
fare state, where a higher level of unemployment insurance partially protects from depend-
ency. Yet, the extent of this mediation depends on the level and duration of unemployment 
benefit payments. 
When making the decision to step out of the labour market, the increase in household utility 
(caused by specialisation and by the realisation of childbearing desires) stands in contrast to 
the depreciation of individual human capital and a reduction of future career opportunities. 
This becomes especially virulent if the unemployed person considers the possibility of a fu-
ture separation. Hence, a long-term commitment to the homemaker role that hampers chances 
of reintegration into the labour market may be risky business, particularly in a societal context 
where the stability of relationships is becoming ever more fragile (see Ott 1998: 73). 
To sum up, when focusing on the role of the homemaker it is evident that the reduction of 
opportunity costs of parenthood caused by the reduced price of time in case of unemployment 
stands opposed to the perceived risk of economic dependence and the deterioration of one’s 
own bargaining position in a couple. How these factors are evaluated depends on the individ-
ual’s human capital investments, on the anticipated employment prospects (which indicate 
chances of recovering the individual bargaining position), and on the degree of mutual trust 
(indicating the likelihood that the significant other will exploit his or her superior bargaining 
position). 
Institutional Mediation of Fertility Behaviour under Unemployment 
During a period of unemployment, the evaluation of whether to start a family is mediated by 
the general labour market prospects as well as by the institutional context. Institutional regu-
lations affect the opportunity costs of parenthood, the options for getting back into em-
ployment, and unemployment benefits. A high degree of labour market closure, common in 
coordinated market economies like Germany, tends to increase the threat of long-term unem-
ployment, and, therefore, of economic dependence. In contrast, liberal market economies pro-
vide limited protections against unemployment-related hardships, due to the generally low-
level of unemployment benefit payments of a short duration. With respect to parenthood, 
these types of states also provide limited support for child-related costs, due to low child 
allowances combined with an underdeveloped childcare infrastructure. In several conservative 14                                                                      
 
welfare states, a low supply of childcare facilities is common, particularly in places where 
norms of maternal care are pronounced. This translates into high opportunity costs of parent-
hood in such countries, which provide a strong incentive to start a family during periods of 
unemployment. Additionally, in many welfare states, unemployment benefits tend to increase 
with the transition to parenthood (see Table 1, p.27) which mitigates some of the adverse ef-
fects of unemployment and provides a minor additional incentive to start a family while un-
employed. In contrast, unemployment support is significantly decreased after prolonged peri-
ods of unemployment. Coordinated market economies provide a lasting support, with unem-
ployment insurance benefits aspiring to near income replacement levels. In contrast, in liberal 
states, the generally low level of support is quickly reduced to a minimum level (see Table 1). 
Particularly in a situation where job prospects are bleak, a generous monetary support for par-
ents alleviates the financial setback of unemployment, and may provide an incentive that tips 
the scales in favour of family formation. 
Moreover, where the interplay of culture and institutional arrangements leads to an ex-
tended  childbirth-related  job-absence,  the  anticipated  opportunity  costs  of  parenthood  are 
higher. Parents-to-be in southern European countries and in Germany in particular usually an-
ticipate this extended duration of occupational absence. In places where strict norms of ma-
ternal care are combined with an underdeveloped childcare infrastructure, extensive maternity 
protection and reinstatement rights (the latter applies to Germany only) result in long periods 
of absence from the labour market. These extensive labour market exits due to motherhood 
are closely related to the ascription of traditional gender roles, reproduced in institutional set-
tings. This signals extensive incompatibilities of work and family formation, which are related 
to the high opportunity costs of parenthood (see Aaberge et al. 2005: 137). 
Hence, if a couple plans to have a child, placing the labour market exit due to parenthood 
within the unemployment episode could serve as a strategy to minimize the duration of labour 
market absence, particularly in countries where the institutional setting induces an extensive 
childbirth-related leave of absence. Opting for such a strategy depends on whether individuals 
conclude that a return to the labour market is easier from unemployment or from a child-
related labour market absence. Reinstatement rights that are part of leave policies, such as 
those in place in Germany or in Finland, certainly provide a strong incentive to start a family 
while still employed, as the depreciation in skill endowments does not interfere with job re-                  Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             15 
 
turn because of the legal protections such a policy provides. This in turn decreases the likeli-
hood to place the transition to parenthood in a period of unemployment, since a quick return 
to the labour market in this context is ruled out in favour of a longer leave period, and particu-
larly since potential employers are likely to be reluctant to hire during pregnancy, given the 
extensive maternity protections (see Soskice 2005). Hence, this combination of unemploy-
ment and family formation signals adverse prospects for human capital development and oc-
cupational opportunities if the woman wants to the return to the labour market in the future. 
More generally, where job protection regulations are extensive – which is the case in many 
coordinated market economies – firms are more reluctant to hire staff, as employment is asso-
ciated with long-term commitments and legal responsibilities. This increases the divide be-
tween labour market insiders and outsiders. Thus, the risk of long-term unemployment in co-
ordinated economies like Germany is higher than in liberal market states like the UK or the 
US with a higher labour turnover (see Hall & Soskice 2001). In this context, chances of re-
entering employment worsen over time in coordinated market economies, providing a strong 
incentive to quickly regain a job. Longer unemployment episodes are likely to foster discour-
agement in job search, making family formation a more promising alternative. In contrast, the 
negative impact of unemployment in liberal market economies appears mainly in the form of 
financial risks due to limited unemployment support, while the risk of long-term unemploy-
ment is generally contained by a higher labour turnover rate. In coordinated economies, the 
financial risks of unemployment are cushioned by generous levels of support. The conserva-
tive welfare state additionally strengthens support for families to cushion them from such life 
course risks. However, in case of female unemployment, this institutional context commonly 
fosters economic dependence on a breadwinner. In particular, women with higher levels of 
education will try to avoid such a constellation, thus aiming to regain a job rather than starting 
a family, which would consolidate a traditional division of labour. 
Gender Roles and Social Norms in the Context of Unemployment and Parenthood 
To sum up the above discussion, institutional regulations mediate the relation between unem-
ployment and family formation through direct monetary support and by affecting the assess-
ment of labour market risks and opportunities, as well as the assessment of the prospects for 
supporting a family. Furthermore, where institutional regulations strengthen families as sup-
port networks, encouraging social support in kinship groups (for example with respect to 16                                                                      
 
childcare), these regulations also reinforce norms of a traditional division of labour in the 
family. Moreover, in societies where traditional gender roles prevail, female unemployment 
has a higher potential of shifting the division of labour towards more traditional arrangements 
(see Klein et al. 1996:70 for reference to Germany). In societies where female labour market 
engagement has becomes increasingly common, the social stigma of joblessness is extended 
to female unemployment (see Hakim 2003: 369). While this stigma presents a strong source of 
social disapproval in societies, oriented toward the labour market, a focus on parenthood can 
raise social esteem and self-perception (see Morgan 2003: 592; Tölke & Diewald 2003: 43ff.). 
Thus, the loss of status due to unemployment might be compensated for by shifting the activ-
ity to the family domain by having a child (see Murphy 1989: 17). Where such a mechanism 
of compensation is in effect, it is probably more pronounced among women with low levels of 
education. On average, these women are younger when having their first child, and extensive 
birth postponemnent and childlessness most likely signals a stronger deviation from reference 
groups, whereas starting a family generates social approval through its compliance with group 
patterns (see generally Leibenstein 1975).
6  
Hypotheses 
As outlined above, the way that actors evaluate family formation during period of unemploy-
ment – whether it presents a promising option or not – depends on a series of factors that most 
likely differ in their impact as well as in the direction of effect. Prolonged unemployment, on 
one hand, may be a signal of bleak prospects for regaining a job. In contrast, longer periods of 
unemployment may also signal that the economic basis for supporting a family has been seri-
ously undermined. Importantly, the effect of unemployment is mediated by a series of en-
dogenous and exogenous factors that alter the opportunity structure, making family formation 
either a promising or inadvisable option. These factors include the individual’s repertoire of 
skill endowments and income capacity, characteristics of the partner’s labour market pros-
pects and income that might compensate for the unemployment of the significant other (see 
Drobnic, Blossfeld & Rohwer 1999: 144). Moreover, mutual trust and extensive reciprocity in 
one’s relationship is an indication of reliable backing and support. Additionally, social norms 
 
                                                            
 
6   Alternatively, Friedman, Hechter & Kanazawa (1994: 383) argue that family formation might compensate oc-
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are key factors in the regulation of occupational and family roles. The extent to which norms 
reprove economic inactivity with a decline in social esteem, or the extent to which a focus on 
parental life might compensate for a loss in job status crucially depends on the gender role 
expectations in a society. Finally, welfare state regulations are essential factors that foster or 
discourage starting a family during a period of unemployment, not only through the extent of 
monetary support but also in the general level of protection from risks, and eventually, by the 
reproduction of either egalitarian or traditional gender roles. 
The following hypotheses aim to present a testable basis for the analysis of differential in-
stitutional and cultural backgrounds and their impact on family formation rationales in the 
context of unemployment. 
H1:  Opportunity cost hypothesis:  Unemployment  lowers  the  opportunity  costs  of  family 
formation.  Childless  persons  therefore  show  a  higher  probability  of  performing  the 
transition to parenthood during periods of unemployment, independent of other factors, 
especially gender. 
H2:  Breadwinner / Homemaker hypothesis: Unemployment increases the probability of first 
birth transitions for women but not for men. This applies in particular to contexts where 
traditional gender roles are predominant, and where women are disadvantaged in the 
labour market. As these contexts consolidate traditional divisions of labour, men – tak-
ing the role as the breadwinner – seek a quick reintegration into the labour market. For 
them, adverse occupational prospects and a lack of economic backing represent dimin-
ished breadwinner qualities, thus reducing the propensity to start a family. 
H3:  Compensation Hypothesis: The loss in social status due to unemployment can be com-
pensated for by a focus on the private domain. Starting a family may thus serve as an 
alternative means of gaining social esteem. This compensation functions for both men 
and women. However, in egalitarian societies, where male contributions to the private 
domain are encouraged, the compensation effect for men should be stronger than in 
countries where traditional gender roles are reproduced. In contrast, for women in tradi-
tional societies, the focus on the homemaker role provides a better opportunity to com-
pensate for social disapproval due to economic inactivity than in egalitarian societies. 
H4:  Human capital investment hypothesis: The effect of unemployment is mediated by levels 
of individual educational and vocational attainment. Higher educated persons pursue a 18                                                                      
 
quick reintegration into the labour market to avoid a depreciation of their human capital 
investments – regardless of gender. They can be expected to perform the transition to 
parenthood in a situation of sound economic perspectives, which support their family 
planning. Persons with lower educational attainment face only a limited depreciation 
human capital in case of unemployment. For them, the reduction in opportunity costs of 
parenthood is critical, resulting in an increased affinity for family formation.  
H5:  Specialization hypothesis: The effect of unemployment is mediated by the relation of 
educational and vocational attainment between the partners. Given an equal
7 or lower 
level of educational attainment on behalf of the woman relative to her partner, female 
unemployment induces a traditional division of labour and a higher tendency to opt for 
parenthood. The affinity for family formation in the case of male unemployment will be 
diminished under these educational constellations. Male unemployment will only in-
duce a greater likelihood of a fertility decision if the educational attainment of the 
woman clearly exceeds that of the man, thus reversing traditional gender roles. 
H6:  Auxiliary hypothesis of duration effects: In extension to hypotheses 3, 4 & 5, the likeli-
hood of starting a family increases for women with the duration of unemployment. This 
is founded on the assumption of growing social disapproval due to economic inactivity, 
and on the assumption that prospects for swift labour market re-entry decline over time, 
eventually leading to discouragement in job search.  
4)  Structural and Institutional Backgrounds in  
   Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
The choice to start a family when facing unemployment is framed by institutional orienta-
tions, labour market structure, predominant norms of occupational participation, and parental 
roles. Moreover, welfare state support mediates the costs of parenthood and provides protec-
tion in case of unemployment. That is, in protecting from risks and hardships, the welfare 
 
                                                            
 
7   Even with equal skill endowments, the woman is still at a disadvantage due to persistently lower obtainable 
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state decisively alters family formation rationales. Policy regulations directly effect the oppor-
tunity costs of parenthood, while the general level of security provided by welfare state pro-
tections very likely influences rationales to place the transition to parenthood in the precari-
ous context of unemployment. In front of this background, cross-national variation in unem-
ployment support and family related policies are likely produce different outcomes in foster-
ing or hindering birth decisions under unemployment. 
By comparing these contextual factors in a cross-national perspective, I aim to establish the 
generality of possible findings and to highlight the impact of specific institutional and cultural 
backgrounds. As Melvin L. Kohn puts it: “...cross-national research is valuable, even indis-
pensable [...] In no other way can we be certain that what we believe to be social-structural 
regularities are not merely particularities, the product of some limited set of historical or cul-
tural or political circumstances” (Kohn 1987: 77).  
The set of countries that will be included in the cross-national comparison include Finland, 
France, Germany, and the UK. The four countries show profound variations in fertility levels 
and labour market structure. Yet, what makes comparing these countries a particularly prom-
ising endeavour is that they display distinct differences in institutional orientation. The under-
lying assumption is that these orientations have a concrete effect on fertility rationales, par-
ticularly in the context of unemployment. The following overview of institutional arrange-
ments in the selected countries will consider the general institutional orientation, labour mar-
ket structure, and will delineate aspects of the social support systems with regard to employ-
ment, unemployment and family benefits, especially parental leave regulations. 
Institutional Orientations 
The UK is a proponent of the liberal welfare state, whereas Finland serves as an example of 
the Scandinavian social-democratic welfare state. France and Germany represent the conti-
nental conservative welfare state (see Esping-Andersen 1999). Social protection is profound 
in Finland. This pertains to a wide array of life course risks that are covered, generous trans-
fers, a broad formulation of eligibility rules and pre-emptive support. The UK represents the 
opposite pole, where risks are largely mediated by the market, and where eligibility for public 
support is limited, means tested, and tends to cover only the most adverse hardships. In con-20                                                                      
 
trast, in both France and Germany, levels of support are extensive and cover a broad array of 
risks. However, in many contexts, eligibility is linked to labour market status (commodifica-
tion). Moreover, the high level of market coordination tends to widen the chasm between a 
high level of protection for the working population and a limited protection for jobless per-
sons. Firms are encouraged to invest in employee skills and training as well as in long-term 
relations, while laying-off staff is made difficult by high legal barriers. As a result, there is a 
strong division between labour market insiders and outsiders, with long-term unemployment 
being one of the most severe life course risks. In contrast, in the liberal market economy of 
the UK, labour market exits and re-entries are much more common. Firms as well as employ-
ees focus more on short-term income maximisation than on long term relations (see Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Diewald & Sill 2004). The important conclusion from this is that in the UK, 
though unemployment protection is minimal, the threat, emanating from this precarious situa-
tion is perhaps much lower than it is in Germany, where unemployment embodies the threat 
of long-term economic dependence and partial exclusion from social life. 
While Germany offers a paradigm of both the conservative welfare state and of a coordi-
nated market economy, France, on the contrary, represents a variation on this pattern in vital 
aspects (see Soskice 2005: 177; Mayer 2005: 35). While the conservative welfare state fosters 
family support and thus encourages traditional gender roles, France, in its laicist tradition 
aims to diminish the influence of families on child socialization by fostering public care, par-
ticularly day-care, and a higher coverage of childcare institutions (see Veil 2005). Women are 
encouraged to participate in employment and are widely relieved from traditional carer duties, 
which are partially provided by the state. Moreover, many welfare transfers in France are di-
rected towards the family unit, while in Germany several benefits implicitly encourage tradi-
tional  institutions  like  marriages  and  single-earner  families.  In  contrast,  most  support  in 
Finland and the UK is individual centred, which alleviates economic dependence on a bread-
winner and nurtures more egalitarian gender roles than in the conservative states. In many of 
the outlined contexts, the GDR, that is East Germany before 1990, rather resembled Finland 
with respect to the encouragement of egalitarian roles and female labour force participation. 
Parallels can also be found to the French model of childcare support and population policy. In 
fact, many of these institutional regulations still echo in the different gender relation still 
prevalent in the East of Germany (see Trappe 1995; Sackmann 2000). The key conclusion                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             21 
 
from the outlined picture is that these institutional contexts crucially shape gender role beliefs 
and thus enact either egalitarian gender roles as in Finland or traditional roles as in Germany.  
Shifting the focus to the UK, the elaborate public childcare system in France finds its coun-
terpart in British preschool education and the high prevalence of boarding schools (see Dienel 
2003). Nevertheless, family affairs in the UK still show an extensive traditionalism, and this 
is despite the fact that women are strongly integrated into the labour market of this liberal 
economy and although individual-centred benefits support egalitarian gender roles. However, 
key elements that foster traditionally segregated gender roles are the low level of public child-
care provision (most extra-familial childcare options are private and thus costly), as well as an 
underdeveloped maternity protection and support, and restrictive employment reinstatement 
rights (see Lewis 1992). In consequence, this renders the UK a strong male-breadwinner state, 
and most likely fosters the transition to motherhood during unemployment, due to reduced 
opportunity costs. 
The aim in Finland is to reduce the pressure on parents by providing an elaborate care sys-
tem that offers a wider variety of life course options by encouraging the combination of work 
and parenthood. Germany, in contrast, stands out in the sample by implicitly showing the 
highest demands on maternal roles. Close individual care and personal sacrifice in relation to 
motherhood are dominant norms in Germany, whereas norms of paternal care are widely ab-
sent and are only slowly starting to diffuse. This is also the consequence of the reproduction 
of traditional familial roles, enacted by ostensibly generous maternal leave regulations that – 
in combination with a low supply of public childcare – encourage female part-time employ-
ment or a general retreat from the labour force after childbirth (Trzcinski & Holst 2003). Ad-
ditionally, regulations like the so-called “Ehegattensplitting”, a specific taxation system for 
spouses, encourage a breadwinner / homemaker model (see Wrohlich & Dell 2005). Particu-
larly for highly educated women with a strong labour market attachment, parenthood thus sig-
nals a high incompatibility with market roles, though maternal support appears to be generous 
at a first glance at German social policies.  
Given the contexts of institutional orientations presented here, and their demands on paren-
tal roles, an unemployment episode that lowers opportunity costs is likely to show a positive 
effect, particularly in countries with high parental role demands and a high potential for role 
conflicts in the work-family nexus, as scarcity of time is a major issue. Thus, opposing gen-22                                                                      
 
der-specific effects of unemployment on family formation for men and women should be ex-
pected, especially in Germany, where a traditional division of labour is still widely in place. 
In contrast, the unemployment effects across gender in Finland and France are probably less 
pronounced, as norms of maternal care are less strict, while the availability and acceptance of 
public care is much more common than in Germany. 
A Glance at National Labour Markets & Unemployment
8 
Labour market structure in the selected countries shows several particularities, which are im-
portant to a closer understanding of how the experience of unemployment and the associated 
uncertainty in occupational prospects affects family formation choices. Key issues in this con-
text will be outlined in the following. 
Female labour force participation is high, particularly in Finland (69.8%) and the UK 
(67.9%). In contrast, female participation rates in Germany (61.5%) and France (60.2%) are 
slightly lower. However, a high share of women in Germany and the UK – between one-third 
and two-fifths of employed women – only work part-time
9 (for all data refer to OECD Em-
ployment and Labour Statistics 2007; see also Figure 6, in the Appendix 0). 
Unemployment rates in the observed countries displayed a clear decline between the early 
1990s and 2001. The only exception to this rule is Germany, where the low to moderate over-
all unemployment rate between 1993 and 2001 remained widely stagnant at around 8%, with a 
peak of about 9% in 1997. Nevertheless, in the wake of labour-market deregulation and in-
creasing global competition, labour market insecurities and precarious employment in Ger-
many increased, particularly during the second half of the 1990s (see DiPrete 2002; Mills & 
Blossfeld 2003). France, during the 1990s showed an increase in flexible work arrangements 
as well. This, however, was not an outcome of labour market deregulation, and France’s insti-
tutional response to macroeconomic global change managed to contain income inequality at 
an historically low level (see DiPrete, Goux, Maurin & Quesnel-Vallee 2006). 
 
                                                            
 
8   Note that this outline of labour market conditions focuses on the settings that were dominant during the time for 
which the empirical analysis will be conducted, that is 1994 to 2001. 
9   In 1993, female part-time employment in the UK lay at 44% while female part-time employment in Germany 
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Finland, in contrast, in the early 1990s faced its deepest recession of the last century, inducing 
a labour market crisis with exceptionally high unemployment rates. Among other factors, this 
crisis was triggered by the collapse of the socialist markets, trade cutbacks, and crisis in the 
financial markets. Unemployment rates rose massively (to a high of about 18% in 1994) with 
one-third  of  all  unemployed  persons  being  long-term  unemployed
10.  In  1993,  the  youth-
unemployment rate (below age 25) lay at 33%. It was among the highest in the EU, and rates 
recovered only slowly from this all-time high. With the labour market crisis, the majority of 
newly initiated work contracts were fixed term, while only 28% of all new contracts were 
unlimited. A high proportion of public employment additionally hampered the ability of state-
intervention, and the Finnish labour market recovered only slowly from this shock. With un-
employment rates at around 9%, Finland still ranked well above the other three countries in 
2001 (see European Parliament 1996; OECD 1996).  










 Source:    OECD Employment and Labour Statistics 2007. SourceOECD online-database. 
In contrast, Great Britain showed a flourishing economic development during the 1990s 
with unemployment rates below 5% in 2001. These rates were the lowest in the quartet. This 
has been related to deregulation and the prevalence of flexible working arrangements in the 
British labour market (see Wells 2001). Yet, a side effect of this deregulation is a high rate of 
 
                                                            
 
10   Long-term unemployment relates to those who are unemployed for one year or longer according to ILO stan-
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flows into and out of employment compared to highly regulated and unionised countries like 
Germany or Finland (see Rubery, Smith, Fagan & Grimshaw 1998: 112ff.) Despite the high 
labour market turnover in the UK, the risk of long-term unemployment is much lower than in 
coordinated market economies like Germany for example, where long-term unemployment 
presents  one  of  the  biggest  threats  associated  with  precarious  employment  (see  Hall  & 
Soskice 2001; Mayer 2004). At 28% of all unemployed persons, the incidence of long-term 
unemployment in the UK in 2000 was lower than the rest of the group (Finland: 29%), par-
ticularly in comparison to France (42,5%) and Germany (51,5%; see OECD 2005). 
Figure 2 shows the gap between male and female unemployment rates, and thus depicts 
gender differences in the risk of becoming unemployed, and in the opportunity to re-enter the 
labour market in case of becoming unemployed. Female unemployment exceeds male unem-
ployment in Germany and France. In the case of Germany, the gender unemployment gap was 
probably emphasized by the fall of the Berlin Wall: In the GDR, female labour force partici-
pation was much more common than in the FRG. Thus, Reunification brought an increase of 
female labour supply. The accommodation of this labour supply in the restructuring of the 
East German labour market was a lasting process. This is also reflected by the fact that the 
gap between male and (higher) female unemployment rates narrowed only slowly throughout 
the 1990s. 









  Source:    OECD Employment and Labour Statistics 2007. SourceOECD online-database. 
  Notes:  Negative values depict female unemployment rates exceeding male rates.  
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Aside from this issue, the picture of a higher female unemployment in Germany and France 
resembles that of most other OECD countries and corresponds to the uneven distribution of 
labour  market  risks  and  opportunities  between  men  and  women.  Women  generally  show 
higher flows into and lower flows out of unemployment. The UK and Finland (at least in the 
early 1990s) stand out as exceptions, seeming to offer better employment opportunities for 
women. However, these figures indicating lower rates of female unemployment are related to 
some particularities of the British and Finnish labour market structure.  
In Finland, more than two-thirds of the employees in the extensive public sector are women 
(see ILO Bureau of Statistics 2007). Before the recession of the early 1990s, work in the pub-
lic sector was commonly based on permanent work contracts, and thus offered good protec-
tion against labour market insecurities. Moreover, the industrial sector, with a comparatively 
low proportion of female employees, was hit particularly hard by the labour market crisis. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that even in Finland where egalitarian roles are encouraged, 
female labour market position is inferior to that of men what is still closely related to higher 
female burdens in domestic responsibilities (see Ollikainen 2006; see generally Azmat, Güell 
& Manning 2006). In fact, with the recovery from the labour market crisis in the second half 
of the 1990s female unemployment again exceeded male unemployment. 
In the UK, in contrast, unemployment of women is generally lower than that of men. A dis-
tinctively lower share of female long-term unemployment compared to Germany, France, or 
most other OECD countries supplements this finding. The underlying causes, however, are 
not substantiated by superior female labour market opportunities, but are rather related to the 
structure of restrictive unemployment support. When eligibility for unemployment support 
ceases in the UK
11, there is no incentive to report being unemployment. In contrast to men, 
however, women commonly turn to domestic duties, particularly in the context of predomi-
nantly traditional gender roles in the UK. Hence women frequently try to regain a job from a 
status of economic inactivity
12. In fact, flows from inactivity to work (and not from unem-
 
                                                            
 
11   This is usually after six months. Unemployment assistance (income-based job seekers allowance) is strongly 
limited due to means testing on basis of partner / household income, thus limiting the incentive to report the 
unemployment, particularly in households with a male breadwinner (see also Table 1, p.27). 
12   All unemployment levels specified above are based on the ILO definition (those who are out of work in the ref-
erence week, want a job, have actively sought work in the last four weeks, and are available to start work within 
the next two weeks). Hence, the ILO indicator does not rely on “registered” unemployment. However, search 26                                                                      
 
ployment to work) of British women rank among the highest in Europe. This proportion of 
inactivity to work flows (47,2% in 1993) clearly exceeds the share in France or in Germany 
(17,6% and 23,5%). On the contrary, flows from unemployment to inactivity are higher in the 
UK compared to Germany or France (see Rubery et al. 1998: 121, 138). 
The context depicted above suggests that female unemployment in the UK is not inevitably 
lower, but rather underreported.
13 This results from the combined impact of a dynamic labour 
market and a rudimentary unemployment benefit system that widely relies on individual ef-
forts to regain a job, thus limiting incentives to report individual unemployment. In the other 
three observed countries, especially in Finland and Germany, the unemployment benefit sys-
tem is much more elaborate (see Table 1 on p.27). In contrast, in the UK the risk of remaining 
in unemployment is reduced, while the system of unemployment insurance is limited in its ca-
pability to protect from the economic risks of unemployment, thus fostering incentives for a 
quick labour market re-entry. 
 
Institutional Regulations and Social Policy Settings
14 
Unemployment Benefit Regulations 
The following overview will outline benefits and transfers related to unemployment and par-
enthood. It remains unclear how such transfers directly affect the transition to parenthood. 
Particularly with respect to the time span that separates the decision to have a child from 
childbirth, a direct positive impact of unemployment benefits on family formation remains 
unclear. It is questionable, if actors do indeed plan childbirth in anticipation of a supportive 
impact of unemployment benefits, especially as this would require to remain unemployed 
from the point of deciding to have a child until after childbirth, which is nine or more months 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
activities are an integral element of the ILO definition. This “active job search” is probably hampered by not 
registering with an unemployment office, thus inducing an underreporting of actual unemployment in the UK. 
13   This is of special importance for an empirical analysis of how unemployment influences fertility decisions, as it 
suggests that a clear separation between unemployment and inactivity is a difficult endeavour in countries 
where benefit systems are rudimentary or eligibility is limited. 
14   Note that this outline of institutional and policy regulations focuses on the settings relevant during the relevant 
time for which the empirical analysis will be conducted, that is 1994 to 2001.                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             27 
 
later. However, a generous support of parents through augmented unemployment benefits sig-
nals protection from economic risks, thus alleviating some of the hardships of unemployment 
that tend to hamper the realization of family formation plans. It is likely that an extensive un-
employment support provides the actors with a general sense of economic backing and secu-
rity. Moreover, for women such support helps to maintain a minimum degree of economic in-
dependence from a breadwinner. 
Table 1:    Unemployment Benefit Regulations in 2002
15 
  Benefit reception –  

















6-32  unlimited  12 within 36  60% of net  7% of last net 
France 
4-60  unlimited  4 within 8 
57,4% of net / 
23,88€ per day/min 
- 
Finland 
23  unlimited  10 within 24 
20%- 42% of net + 
22,75€ per day 
4€-8€ per day 
(1) Additional regulations apply. Duration and benefit reception were subject to change between 1994 and 2002. 
For details refer to Pellizari (2004: 39f.) 
(2) The duration and amount of benefit reception may vary according to the duration of the employment record 
(contribution period), the age and the family situation of the beneficiary if ranged value is specified. 
(3) Income-based job seeker’s allowance. Means tested minimum support (based on family income). Only available 
if the partner works part-time or less (<24 hours/week). 
Source: MISSOC 2002; Carone, Immervoll, Paturot & Salomäki 2004. 
Finland combines generous regulations of entitlement combined with comparatively high 
payments.  Moreover,  labour  market  reintegration  is  fostered  by  public  training  centres 
(OECD 1995: 109). In contrast, unemployment insurance payments in the UK are low and 
cover only a short duration of six months. Subsequent unemployment assistance is widely un-
available due to means testing based on household income. Hence, if a breadwinner exists in 
the household, unemployment support usually ceases after six months. Consequently, this es-
tablishes a profound economic dependence on a breadwinner and either exerts a strong pres-
sure to re-enter the labour market, or has most likely a traditionalising effect on the partner-
ship if the woman is unemployed. In Finland, France, and Germany the amount of transfers is 
reduced with unemployment assistance, but benefits are available for a longer duration than 28                                                                      
 
in the UK, where the rules for eligibility for unemployment assistanvce are quite restrictive. 




The following section will provide an overview of child-related benefits and incentives that 
directly (as in the case of monetary transfers) or indirectly (as in the case of leave regulations) 
affect fertility decisions. Moreover, such institutional regulations diminish opportunity costs 
of parenthood, for example, where the coverage of public childcare disburdens parents from 
care duties, or increases opportunity costs, for example, where policy regulations reinstate 
traditional gender roles, thus increasing maternal burdens.  
Table 2:    Leave Regulations and Family Related Subsidies 
  Maternity & 
Paternity Leave 







  Duration  Type  %  Leave & Subsidies  (1
st child) 




13 weeks since 1999 
105€ flat / month 
D  14 weeks  maternity  3 years; flat rate for 2 yrs 
(307€, means tested)  154€ flat / month 





3 years; flat rate for 2 yrs with 
2nd child (496€) APE(3) + 
160€ for 3 yrs APJE(4) 
none  
(111€ for 2nd child) 
 




     
90 
(1) 














26,5 weeks, ~70% net wage 
replacement (2) 
90€ flat / month 
(1) Statutory Maternity Pay. Means tested option of Maternity Allowance (115€/week, for 18 weeks).  
(2) Min. 11,45€/day flat or higher wage replacement (depending on labour contracts). 
(3) Allocation Parentale d’Education; 1994 extension of parental leave regulations: Eligibility with the 2
nd child 
(previously the 3
rd child). Prerequisite 2 years of employment within last 5 years. 
(4) Allocation Pour Jeune Enfant, childrearing leave. 
(5) No wage replacement for unemployed except in Germany (low flat rate by health insurance); Parental leave 
payments for unemployed in Germany and France (see 
(3) & 
(4)). 
Sources: Kamerman 2000, MISSOC 2002. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
15   Specified regulations apply to the period of the empirical investigations to be conducted (1994 to 2001). 
16   Germany: 7% of previous net income; Finland 4€ to 18€/day (see MISSOC 2002).                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             29 
 
In our sample of welfare states, two major pathways can be identified in the field of family 
policies: On one side, certain countries promote regulations that make it easier to combine 
work and family. They do so by encouraging flexible working hours and by establishing ex-
tensive day- and infant-care systems. This is the case, particularly in Finland
17 and France. On 
the other side, there are family policy regimes that, through financial policies or regulations, 
encourage women to retreat from the labour force. This is actively accomplished in Germany, 
through generous leave regulations in combination with a low coverage of public childcare, 
resulting in an extensive female labour market absence subsequent to childbirth. In Great 
Britain, traditional carer roles are encouraged primarily through a neglect of public care sup-
ply (see Lewis 1992).  
The maternity and parental leave regulations among these four countries underline the im-
pression that German family policy cultivates a traditional division of labour. In all four coun-
tries during the period of observation (1994-2001), maternity leave payments take the form of 
a replacement of previous (net) wages. Only France and Finland also offer a paid paternity 
leave around birth, thus promoting paternal engagement in childcare. Given the duration and 
the amount of wage replacement, France, Finland, and Germany roughly offer about the same 
level and duration of maternity leave payments (see Table 2). In the UK, however, wage re-
placement lasts for only 6 weeks (a low-level flat rate is available for an additional 12 weeks), 
which consequently adheres to the logic of a liberal market economy that encourages a swift 
return of mothers to the labour force. This conclusion is further backed by the fact that paren-
tal leave schemes were non-existent before 1999 and currently only last for 13 weeks. Job re-
turn guarantees are limited to the duration of maternity protection and parental leave (see 
MISSOC 2002). In contrast, Germany and France combine lasting parental leave payments 
with even longer rights of reinstatement as part of their leave policies (3 years with 2 years 
paid). Although the leave can be shared among the partners, parental leave in practice how-
ever is taken almost solely by mothers. Only a marginal proportion of the fathers take up part 
of their leave, even in Finland (see Aaberge et al. 2005: 137). The long duration of the leave 
provides a strong incentive for French and German women to retreat from the labour force, 
 
                                                            
 
17   Although it should be noted that Finland is perhaps rather traditional with respect to families policy settings, 
compared to the other Scandinavian countries, it is nevertheless the most progressive among the analysed coun-
tries in encouraging egalitarian gender roles. 30                                                                      
 
and Germany further nourishes this rationale by rationing childcare supply. In contrast, in 
Finland the parental leave is based on an income replacement, offering significant payments 
and thus encouraging female labour market integration prior to parenthood. In combination 
with a limited duration of eligibility (compared to Germany and France), this offers a strong 
incentive for labour-market reintegration of mothers. 
The parental transfer systems in the observed countries show the lowest levels of support in 
the UK. Considering the financial burdens of rearing a child, we can assume that the transi-
tion to parenthood from a position of unemployment requires a sound backing by an income 
earner. Monetary subsidies of parents take the from of a means tested flat rate in France and 
Germany. But under the French APE (Allocation Parentale d’Education) they are only paid 
for higher order births, excluding first children. In terms of first-birth transitions, only Ger-
many offers significant monetary transfers, for which unemployed persons are also eligible 
(“Erziehungsgeld”). 
The opportunity costs of parenthood, and thus also the incentives to start a family during 
(female) unemployment is fundamentally affected by institutional support to combine gainful 
employment with parenthood in the form of public childcare provision (see Gornic, Meyers & 
Ross 1996). In our sample, Finland has by far the most elaborate system of external care for 
infants and young children with a high level of coverage. This complies with the Scandina-
vian model of subsidizing family services to enable the combination of work and family. With 
a similar level of coverage, the childcare system in France is also able to disburden parents in 
this regard (see Neyer 2003). The UK follows the principle of encouraging diversity and dy-
namics on a widely privatised care system (see Mahon 2002: 354). Although there is some fi-
nancial support for childcare in the UK, the costs of childcare for working parents remain 
among the highest in the EU (see Bradshaw & Finch 2002). Just like in the UK, German par-
ents face increased costs of external childcare if (familial) support networks are unavailable, 
particularly in the West of Germany, where the supply of public childcare is underdeveloped. 
For the East of Germany, the higher coverage of childcare has been positively associated with 
fertility (see Hank, Kreyenfeld & Spieß 2004). 
Concluding this overview, Finland displays the most generous system of family support 
with a clear aim of enabling the combination of family and work. This is in part also true for 
France. Germany, which also spends large amounts on family support, still follows a policy                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             31 
 
that favours the male breadwinner-principle (see Pfau-Effinger 1996: 479). The respective 
package of financial and childcare support tends to detract women from the labour market and 
establishes strong dependencies from the man. In the case of sequencing parenthood and un-
employment, one situation of dependency is followed by another. Higher educated women in 
particular  will  probably  try  to  avoid  such  a  consolidation  of  labour  market  absence  (see 
Aaberge et al. 2005 141f.). 
5)      Data and Methods 
The following overview will outline the fundaments of the empirical analysis. Initially, I will 
provide some introductory notes on the design of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). This is followed by a description of the population of the analysis, which includes 
birth cohorts from 1955 to 1983, observed between 1994 and 2001. Finally, I will outline the 
causal design of the multivariate analysis and specify the statistical characteristics of the ap-
plied piecewise constant hazard estimates. 
The European Community Household Panel 
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  data  of  the  European  Community  Household  Panel 
(ECHP). This longitudinal data set provides representative data on the population in the EU 
member states between 1994 to 2001. Data collection was harmonized ex ante (see Günther 
2003), making the ECHP a unique data base for comparative research across the EU. The 
sample  of  countries  in  the  empirical  analysis  consists  of  the  UK,  Germany,  France  and 
Finland. For Germany and the UK, the ECHP data was cloned from national panels, namely 
the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
18. 
Hence, in these cases an ex post data harmonisation was carried out, which however was 
strictly oriented on the ECHP questionnaire and data-structure, providing comparability in 
 
                                                            
 
18   Data structure and contents of the ECHP questionnaire were initially designed with a close orientation on 
SOEP and BHPS. Thus, the cloning process provides a high level of data congruency. 32                                                                      
 
most areas. For the selected countries, all eight waves of the ECHP are available except for 
Finland, which has only been taking part in the ECHP since 1996.  
The focus of the ECHP questionnaire rests on income and labour market-related topics. Un-
fortunately, the availability of subjective indicators, as well as of demographic and family re-
lated information is clearly limited. This curtails the set of indicators in the following empiri-
cal analysis. Among others, the ECHP provides no data on childbearing preferences or on 
preferences for alternative (i.e. occupational) goals. Moreover, data on partnership duration is 
only available for married couples. 
Data Description and Population of Analysis 
First-Births in the ECHP 
In the analysis of gender-specific effects of unemployment on family formation, I focus solely 
on the transition to first-parenthood
19. As the ECHP lacks biographical information on parent-
hood, the identification of biological kinship is a difficult endeavour. Parent-child status is as-
signed on basis of observed household composition. Parents who no longer live with their 
child in the same household may spuriously appear to be childless. This results in two biasing 
effects: a) an underestimation of the number of parents (if a parent misleadingly appears to be 
childless because he or she no longer shares a household with the child), or b) in a misspecifi-
cation of the timing of first birth (if the parent no longer lives with his/her first child, the old-
est co-residing child will be misinterpreted as first-child). This bias however is limited, as 
even the oldest of the observed cohorts, born in 1955, most likely still lived together with 
their first child in 1994. The mentioned bias of misspecifying the timing of family formation 
(or the status of being childless) is perhaps most severe for men, who – after a separation – no 
longer share a household with their first child. 
Set of Covariates & Unemployment Indicators 
 
                                                            
 
19   The life course change, and hence the pondering of becoming a parent is much more complex than the choice to 
have additional children (see Hobcraft & Kiernan 1995). Moreover, most parents tend to place first and second 
birth into a rather narrow time frame, what results in the increased probability of childbirth if a couple already 
has a young child (see Kreyenfeld & Huinink 2003).                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             33 
 
The individual-centred variables considered in the estimates include the net monthly personal 
income, as an indicator of the ability to support a family, and the reception of individual-
based transfers. These monetary indicators have been adjusted for purchasing power parity 
within the EU to guarantee comparability across countries as well as over time. Educational 
attainment in the ECHP is provided in the form of the ISCED indicator
20. This classification 
aggregates formal and vocational degrees, and is applied in the model as an indicator of hu-
man capital investments and labour market options. As outlined above, information regarding 
childbearing preferences is unavailable, just like detailed indicators of individual biographical 
plans.  
There is a central group of variables that pertain to labour market participation. I will dis-
tinguish between different forms of activity, namely, full-time and part-time employment, be-
ing in education, economic inactivity, and housework. Special attention will be paid to differ-
ent measures of unemployment. The individual experience of unemployment is available on a 
monthly basis in the ECHP calendar of activities. All the information within the calendar of 
activities is subject to self-ascription. Thus, it is not necessarily congruent with the ILO-
concept of unemployment (see footnote 12). A possibly biasing effect might occur with re-
spect to jobless respondents. That is, where the eligibility for unemployment benefits is re-
stricted, this may also affect the respondents’ self-perception of activity status, which might 
result in stating either unemployment or economic inactivity
21. This is an issue, particularly 
where benefit eligibility ceases after a relatively short time as in the UK (see p. 25f.). Hence, I 
will carefully consider the impact of economic inactivity in the empirical investigation as a 
potentially sequential state, succeeding longer unemployment episodes. As unemployment has 
been assumed to signal bleak labour market prospects and deteriorating human capital, the du-
ration of unemployment will form an integral part of the analysis. In this context, I will dis-
tinguish between short-term unemployment (which I define as up to four months of continu-
ous unemployment) and longer unemployment episodes. While longer periods of unemploy-
ment reveal difficulties encountered in quickly regaining a new job and hence are likely asso-
ciated with discouragement, shorter periods of unemployment are frequently related to fric-
 
                                                            
 
20   “International Standard Classification of Education” (for details see OECD 2001). 34                                                                      
 
tional unemployment in search for a new job, and thus are limited in their impact on family 
formation rationales. Further distinctions, particularly in consideration of long-term unem-
ployment, would have been promising but are precluded due to limitations in case numbers. 
However, I will take into account whether a person has had periods of long-term unemploy-
ment during the last five years, assuming that this hampers occupational prospects and thus, 
affects family formation. 
Gender-Specific Analysis and Partner Data  
I will consider the transitions to first parenthood for women as well as for men. To elaborate 
gender-specific particularities, especially in the context of unemployment, it is essential to es-
timate separate models for men and for women. To account for the fact that the situation and 
resources of the partner still play a vital role, the individual-centred models will be supple-
mented with according partner data (Model IV)
22. The partner variables to be considered in-
clude net personal income, relative income (one-third or less of partner, about even with part-
ner, one-third or more than partner, reflecting relative bargaining power), transfers reception 
(signalling economic dependence), and vocational and educational attainment (as an indicator 
of human capital investments), as well as a possible unemployment of the partner. More gen-
erally, these partner indicators provide vital information when family formation is backed by a 
second earner, and they offer a view on the degree of traditionalism in gender roles in a spe-
cific couple. 
Design of the Multivariate Analysis 
The empirical analysis is organised to account for the effect of different consequences of un-
employment on the likelihood to start a family. For each of the selected countries, France, 
Finland, Germany, and the United Kingdom, a model for men and a model for women will be 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
21   Due to reasons of SOEP data conversion, the German calendar of activities includes only reported unemploy-
ment. A biasing effect however is limited, as unemployment in Germany is commonly reported in order to be-
come eligible for unemployment insurance and assistance benefits. 
22   Partner-based estimations can be only be carried out for persons with valid information on the partner (i.e. sur-
vey participation of the partner). Where couples do not share a joint household, or where a partner refuses to 
participate in the ECHP (unit non-response), an analytical focus on couples incorporates a bias in the estimates.                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             35 
 
estimated separately in order to outline country-specific, as well as gender-specific effects. 
Model I examines the mere effect of individual unemployment on the likelihood to start a 
family and differentiates between the impact of short-term (up to 4 months) and longer unem-
ployment (> 4 months). This distinction of unemployment duration is also the basis for all fur-
ther models (except for Model III). Model II implements a broad set of covariates. Unem-
ployment duration is conceptualised as part of the employment status, aside from full-time 
and part-time employment, education and inactivity. Model III resembles Model II but relies 
on the consideration of interaction effects between educational attainment and unemployment 
(no duration effects considered). As outlined above, Model IV integrates partner data. Again 
differentiating between men and women, Model V aggregates the data across the four coun-
tries, and interaction effects between country and unemployment are calculated. 
Dependent Variable in the Event History Model 
The dependent variable in the event history model is the occurrence of a first birth. In the 
ECHP, the time of birth is available on a monthly level
23 I argue from a perspective that per-
ceives the first birth as a consequence of a rational decision, in which this decision is criti-
cally influenced by constraining factors at the time of this decision. The point of making this 
decision is approximated with a point in time ten months prior to birth. The key goal is to ac-
count for endogeneity problems in the influence of the set of covariates and particularly of 
unemployment on the fertility decision
24. This procedure of backdating may at first glance ap-
pear to be vague in representing the time of decision. However, Bongaarts (1982: 76f.), with 
reference to various medical studies, highlights that the probability of a couple that plans to 
have a child to conceive within one cycle lies at 50% and is even higher among younger par-
ents below 30. This suggests that the proportion of couples for whom the backdating provides 
a misspecification of more than two to three months is limited. Hence, a biasing effect on 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
Moreover, 10% – 20% of first-births in the ECHP or not covered in the partner models as some first-births are 
by single mothers, while some couples do not share a household (at the time of deciding to have a child). 
23   While the month of birth was unavailable for Germany in the original ECHP data, it has been supplemented on 
basis of SOEP data for the study at hand. 
24   What is most important is that a backdating of ten months guarantees integrity of the measured direction of 
causality. That is, all covariates are measured before the time of conception and hence before deciding to have 
that child. A misspecification of the duration effect of unemployment occurs in cases, where the decision for 





















model estimates due to inaccurate backdating should be considered but is likely limited in the 
size of effect. The procedure to backdate by ten months will hence likely provide conservative 
results. 




















Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (author’s estimates);                 n of subjects= 8.093 / n of events = 1.952. 
The focus on the population at risk requires the exclusion of persons who are widely inhibited 
from childbirth due to age. The time at risk in the empirical model starts with age 16 (which is 
also the age of eligibility for participation in the ECHP) and lasts until age 45. Although we 
can find a postponement in the timing of births throughout all Western societies, the transition 
to first parenthood beyond the age of 45 is rare, which applies for both genders – at the very 
least – due to biological limits (see also Figure 3). As the delay in the timing of births also in-
cludes a catching-up at higher ages – especially among higher educated persons – age has to 
be an integral part of the model. 
Specification of the Statistical Model 
In sum, I consider any first births between the parental ages of 16 to 45 during the time of 
analysis (1994 to 2001). Focusing on the duration until first-birth occurrence, I apply event 
history methods in analysing the impact of unemployment. The time axis of the model is con-
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
out, however, suggest that backdating the month of birth between ten and twelve month provides similarly ro-
bust results.                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             37 
 
stituted by the age of the respondent in months. Process time starts with the first month in the 
16th year since the respondent’s birth (month 193). The time of observation starts with entry 
into the panel. This is the case if a person is a respondent in the ECHP starting wave in 1994, 
if a panel member reaches the 16
th year of age, or if a person moves into a panel household. 
The period of observation ends ten months prior to the occurrence of the first birth or at panel 
exit, in which case the spell is regarded as censored. Finally, I consider respondents of the co-
horts 1955 to 1983 who are still childless (i.e. who are still at risk of first birth).  
As first-birth risk (taken as proxy for the first-birth decision) is not uniformly distributed 
across the age range in question a model is required that is capable of incorporating the func-
tional form of the baseline hazard (see Figure 4). An appropriate model in this case is a 
piecewise-constant exponential hazard model (see Jenkins 2005: 38f.),
25 which is specified in 
the following form
26: 
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  (0.1) 
The regression parameters g and b refer to the time variant (Z) respectively to the time invari-
ant (X) set of covariates. The baseline hazard q  remains constant within the five intervals t1 to 
t5, where t1 starts with the 16
th year of age (month 193 since respondents birth), and differs be-
tween the intervals
27. With the selection of time intervals, specified in (1.1), a normal distribu-
tion of the baseline hazard of first-birth risk is approximated, where the highest risk is as-
sumed to rest in the interval between month 313 to 396 (age 26 to 33). Figure 4 graphically 
displays the separation of time intervals, based on annual age (at 16, 21, 26, 33, 38, and 45). 
While the piecewise constant is a semi-parametric continuous time model, the time until 
birth is based on a discrete measurement with monthly intervals. Yet, the average duration in 
 
                                                            
 
25   The technical application relies on a piecewise constant script for Stata, elaborated by Sorensen 1999. 
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Age
adult life until first birth is several years. A monthly collection of birth events may therefore 
be treated as an approximation of continuous data (see Jenkins 2005: 19f.). 










Source:  ECHP 1994-2001 (author’s estimates)                n of subjects= 8.093 / n of events = 1952. 
Note:    Hazard rate based on monthly risk. 
As specified above, I include time invariant variables (e.g., gender or country of origin) as 
well as time variant variables (e.g., educational attainment, or benefit reception) Most of the 
time-varying variables, however, are available on an annual basis only. The month of a status 
change for a time varying variable will be based on a mean between the interview in t and the 
previous interview before the change in t-1, in order to minimise any bias incorporated by im-
proper status ascription. Where this approximation interferes with the investigated sequence 
of events (i.e. constraints in t0 affect fertility choices in t1), the information is collected from 
the last interview prior to the birth decision in order to maintain the focus on the implied cau-
sality of events. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
27   The constant hazards within each of these time intervals do in fact each represent an exponential hazard model 
(which in turn is a specification of the Weibull model with a = 1).                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             39 
 
6)      Results of the Multivariate Analysis  
The multivariate analysis focuses on different indicators of unemployment and precarious 
employment. The way in which these contexts influence family formation choices will be dis-
cussed in the following. Indicators, which have been considered, but which are not displayed 
with the results in Table 4 – Table 8 (p. 57ff) include control dummies for calendar year, for 
household size
28, as well as for the country of origin
29. Additional omitted control variables 
include being in public employment, in self-employment and having a fixed term contract (see 
p.46 for a brief discussion). A detailed description of the empirical models beyond what was 
already outlined in the previous section can be found on p.56.  
Basic Effects 
The multivariate analysis of the effect of unemployment on family formation indicates varia-
tions across gender and country level. An initial set of estimates (Model I) only distinguishes 
the impact of short-term (1-4 months) and longer unemployment (>4 months), ignoring any 
further covariates
30. In this context, I find clear evidence for gender-specific opposing effects 
of unemployment on family formation. The impact is consistently negative among men and 
positive among women. Only women in France and men in the UK deviate from this picture, 
and do not show any significant effects. More generally, the impact of unemployment remains 
insignificant if unemployment duration is rather short. That is, it is predominantly longer un-
employment episodes of more than four months of continuous unemployment that show sig-
nificant effect levels. The impact of longer unemployment is negative among men and posi-
tive among women. Women in Finland however deviate from this otherwise persistent pattern 
across those countries, where unemployment affects family formation rationales. Among Fin-
sih women, only shorter unemployment episodes of up to four months show a positive effect 
on the likelihood to start a family. The latter effect also remains widely constant across all es-
timated models. 
 
                                                            
 
28   Household size serves as indicator of potential care networks, presumably reducing opportunity costs. 
29   Furthermore, the categories in the dummy sets on activity status on educational attainment (ISCED), on rela-
tive income, on marital duration, on country of origin and on household size have been supplemented by a 
dummy-category for missing data. 
30   A model immanent consideration of the piecewise constant baseline hazards is included in all models. 40                                                                      
 
A Detailed View on Unemployment across Countries 
Controlling for a set of covariates reveals key characteristics of gender differences in the role 
of unemployment in family formation. Aside from occupational discouragement in the case of 
longer unemployment episodes, the reduction in disposable household income is perhaps the 
most drastic occurrence related to losing a job. Importantly, the negative impact of unem-
ployment on deciding to become a father, previously found in France, Finland, and Germany, 
vanishes after controlling for net monthly income, transfer reception, and educational attain-
ment
31 in the estimates. This provides an initial hint that the negative unemployment effects 
among men are closely related to a decline in breadwinner capabilities as a lacking prerequi-
site  for  family  formation  (see  also  Oppenheimer  1994;  Tölke  2005).  In  contrast,  among 
women in Finland, Germany, and the UK, the pronounced positive impact of unemployment 
on the propensity to start a family remains fairly robust after controlling for additional charac-
teristics. After considering (among other factors) the impact of partnership-status, income re-
ception and educational attainment (see Models II & IV), the effect of longer unemployment 
among women (short-term unemployment in the case of Finland) persistently remains about 
two to three times higher than among full-time working women with a permanent contract 
(reference category). 
In analysing the effects of the duration of unemployment, I have also considered linear ef-
fects with a decreasing marginal utility, representing a growing discouragement that reaches a 
maximum after a specific amount of time. However, estimates not displayed revealed that 
there are obviously different threshold level effects across countries (most likely related to the 
duration of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits and their amount), which affect 
the relation between unemployment duration and the propensity to start a family. Summariz-
ing these findings, the assumption of a simple linear effect of unemployment duration could 
not be validated with significant results
32. 
 
                                                            
 
31   Additional estimates not provided with the multivariate results on p.57ff., could trace the negative effect of un-
employment among men primarily to the role of forgone income combined with an impact of educational at-
tainment and the backing of a second earner. 
32   In this context, a distinction between short-, mid-, and long-term unemployment would certainly have been use-
ful, but was rejected in favour of obtaining stable estimates under given case numbers. Moreover, given the fact 
that the exact measurement of unemployment duration at the time of family formation is opposed by an ap-
proximation of the time of fertility decision through backdating, conducted sensitivity tests suggest that a dis-
tinction between shorter and longer unemployment provides sufficiently stable results.                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             41 
 
An initial summary of the duration effects of unemployment suggests that the perceived in-
creases in insecurity and economic risks are limited in their impact on family formation as 
long as they are associated with shorter unemployment episodes. Obviously, welfare support 
tends to cushion the initial negative economic consequences of unemployment. An impact of 
unemployment that entails discouragement regarding occupational prospects sets in only after 
a longer duration of labour market absence. Obviously – with the exception of Finland, where 
brief episodes of job absence already tend to show an impact – short-term unemployment only 
causes a limited detachment from the labour market, and thus a limited impact on family for-
mation rationales. 
Yet, it should be noted that it is not possible to distinguish between persons who have en-
tered unemployment voluntarily, those who are confident they can quickly regain a job, and 
persons, who have lost their job involuntarily. Among the latter group, some certainly antici-
pate bleak occupational prospects after only a short duration of unemployment. The distinc-
tion between shorter and longer unemployment episodes only serves as an approximation, 
with the goal of separating the confident job-searcher from the discouraged unemployed, for 
whom the impact on family formation is likely more pronounced. In this context, the fact that 
even short-term unemployment among Finnish women increases the likelihood to have a first 
child (and increases the reluctance to do so among Finnish men, for whom the effect however 
is rather spurious) could be a consequence of the Finnish labour market crisis during the 
1990s. This crisis most likely had a strong negative impact on economic and, in particular, oc-
cupational prospects, thus promoting the transition to motherhood even in an institutional 
context that otherwise offers comparatively good conditions to combine work and family. 
That is, this takes place in an institutional context that should generate only a limited need to 
place the transition to motherhood within an unemployment episode. 
While longer unemployment among women in Germany and the UK shows particularly ro-
bust effects of an increased likelihood to start a family, France is the only example among the 
observed countries, where unemployment generates a negative impact on the decision to be-
come a mother. However, this effect of longer unemployment only shows a low level of sig-
nificance (p=0.085) and should thus be interpreted with caution. Yet, what is interesting is 
that this indicator is only significant after controlling for partner characteristics (like partner 
income, partner education, and individual income relative to that of the partner; see Model 42                                                                      
 
IV). This means that even in a context where a partner could compensate the loss in family 
income caused by the female unemployment, French women still favour labour market reinte-
gration over family formation. Obviously, women in this country place a high value on eco-
nomic independence, which is also supported by the finding that a higher relative income 
among French women reduces the probability of deciding to have a child. These findings are 
in line with the perception of an extensive and accurate system of family support in France 
that enables women to combine occupational and familial responsibilities. These findings are 
furthermore consistent with a cultural background that does not rely on strict norms of mater-
nal care, as in Germany, e.g., and that has a long tradition of encouraging female labour mar-
ket attachment (see Veil 2005; see also Section 3.4). 
Nevertheless, there are some indications that persistent occupational hardships also tend to 
distract women from their occupational engagement in France: Only among French women, 
can I identify a relation between variations in regional unemployment rate and the likelihood 
of deciding to have a first child. An increase in the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point 
increases the propensity to start a family by 3%. However, once again, these results should be 
interpreted with caution: The referred result is based on a low level of significance and France 
remains the only country with any significant relation between regional unemployment rate 
and first-birth risk. These somewhat “meagre” findings should not be interpreted to suggest 
that bleak economic prospects do not affect the realization of family formation plans. How-
ever, they sheds some doubt on the assumption that unemployment rate is an appropriate indi-
cator of how the actors evaluate occupational prospects. This also nourishes the impression 
that the mechanism translating perceived aggregate unemployment – or more generally aggre-
gate economic indicators – into fertility behaviour is perhaps more complex than implied by 
frameworks like the Easterlin Hypothesis (1962, 1966), or the Butz & Ward model (1979, see 
critically Kramer & Neusser 1984, or Macunovich 1995). 
Economic Inactivity 
In the above section, I have discussed that, in the UK, the female return to work frequently 
occurs from a position of economic inactivity (see Section 0). This is important since it high-
lights that the distinction between unemployment and inactivity is closely related to national 
models of coping with unemployment – both individually and in terms of institutional unem-
ployment support. In this context, some of the unemployment in the UK – particularly if it is                   Gender-Specific Effects of Unemployment on Family Formation                             43 
 
longer unemployment – appears as economic inactivity. This is the case when job search ac-
tivities or at least the availability for work is a prerequisite of unemployment support. Unem-
ployment insurance and particularly the duration of eligibility for benefits is extensive in the 
all  of  the  observed  countries.  However,  in the UK, eligibility for unemployment benefits 
ceases after a relatively short time. Yet, where search activities are no longer compulsory be-
cause the duration of unemployment exceeds the period of benefit eligibility, the link to the 
labour market becomes more fragile. In such a context, actors are more likely to perceive 
themselves as being inactively out of the labour force, rather than being unemployed
33. The 
same applies, if repeated failure in job-search activities has discouraged the confidence to re-
enter the labour market in the near future. Importantly, the monthly activity status in this con-
text is recorded as a self-ascribed status in the ECHP. 
Underlying this line of reasoning is that economic inactivity does not only succeed a longer 
unemployment episode but is also closely related to occupational discouragement. In this con-
text, starting a family from a position of economic inactivity could also be attractive as a 
means of compensating for the loss in social esteem, which is likely profound after an ex-
tended period of inactivity, given strong norms to participate in gainful employment or at least 
to focus on alternative, socially accepted forms of activity like parenthood. Indeed, the multi-
variate findings suggest distinct effects of economic inactivity on the propensity to decide for 
the transition to motherhood. The strength of the effects varies from an increased likelihood 
of 50% in France and Germany, to a likelihood of starting a family during periods of inactiv-
ity in the UK that is more than 6 times higher than among full-time employed women. The 
fact that this impact is extensive in the UK and comparatively weak among German women is 
most likely indebted to the fact that lasting eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits in 
Germany maintains a closer link to the labour market, and thus to the status of being in unem-
ployment. In contrast, a higher number of jobless women tend to report their status as inactive 
in the UK, where job-search activities are no longer compulsory even after a short duration of 
unemployment, undermining a close attachement to the labour force. 
Moreover,  economic  inactivity  primarily  shows  an  impact  among  women.  In  contrast, 
among men, economic inactivity signals a profound inability to support a family. However, 
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male inactivity is generally rare, and the impact on the likelihood to start a family remains 
widely insignificant. Exceptions to this rule are men in the UK, who show an increased rate of 
transition into first-parenthood during inactivity. This relation is only significant in the part-
ner model (Model IV), which means that another income earner and a stable relationship fre-
quently  back  this  inactivity. This finding appears to contradict the UK as being a strong 
breadwinner country (see Lewis 1992). However, the occupational pressure in this liberal 
market economy could in fact lead to a reversal of traditional roles. Where men are incapable 
of regaining a job and thus fulfilling a breadwinner role, the economic support by a female in-
come earner could nourish the tendency to compensate for the occupational status loss by fo-
cusing on a male homemaker role
34 (see argumentatively Tölke & Diewald 2003 for Ger-
many). Yet, the reversal of traditional gender roles remains a somewhat speculative assump-
tion. Further investigation in future research might shed more light in this issue and unravel 
whether this finding indeed represents a reversal of traditional roles under social pressure.  
Earlier Long-Term Unemployment 
The effect of earlier long-term unemployment (12 months or more) during the last 5 years was 
considered in the multivariate analysis in order to account for latent factors of economic inse-
curity and deterioration of one’s occupational position. In detail, I assume a twofold impact 
effect for persons, who have experienced this lasting exclusion from the labour market in their 
recent occupational biography. 1) Prior long-term unemployment persistently hampers labour 
market integration and obtainable income prospects by deteriorating skill endowments. While 
this effect can in part be ruled out by the consideration of personal income in the empirical 
models, the second issue is perhaps more important. 2) The experience of long-term unem-
ployment increases occupational insecurities, thus undermining occupational prospects and 
economic reliability. In this context, the experience of long-term unemployment might func-
tion as a trigger event that might either signal reduced breadwinner capabilities among men, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
inactivity is frequently a sequential state that suceeds a longer unemployment episode.  
34   Initial unemployment insurance payments in the UK cease after 6 months with subsequent social assistance 
payments. These payments are based on household income and family size, which poses an additional incentive 
to have a child, where occupational prospects are bleak. Perhaps a labour market reintegration is anticipated, as 
long as unemployment insurance regulations encourage job-search activities, while a longer labour market ab-
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or encourage a focus on family formation as an alternative biographical option beyond em-
ployment (see DiPrete & McManus 2000; Friedman et al. 1994). 
In fact, the impact of previous long-term unemployment appears to be most pronounced in 
France, where among men, an instable and precarious employment career clearly hampers the 
ability to support a family. What appears to be a straightforward relation at first glance, how-
ever should be interpreted with caution: The effects only show a low level of significance and 
disappear after controlling for partner characteristics. In Model V, which integrates all coun-
try-level effects into one model for men and one for women (both utilize partner data), I can-
not find any significant impact of previous long-term unemployment among men.  
Among women, two different patterns distinguish France on one side from Germany and 
the UK on the other side. For French women, the experience of long term unemployment dur-
ing the last five years – obviously lastingly – increases the likelihood to opt for motherhood. 
Perhaps a focus on motherhood as alternative to employment in France only sets in after a 
close link to the labour market has been harmed, undermining the otherwise pronounced la-
bour market focus, common among French women. 
In contrast, for women in Germany and the UK, long-term unemployment during the last 
five years shows a negative impact on the likelihood to decide for a first child. At first glance, 
this  seems  to  contradict  the  pronounced  positive  impact  of  longer  unemployment  among 
women in these countries. However, this apparent contradiction is most likely a selection ef-
fect of women with a strong labour market attachment: Given that long-term unemployment in 
Germany and the UK tends to speed up the transition to motherhood, this excludes the con-
cerned women from the sample, as they are no longer at risk to perform the transition to par-
enthood. Thus, women that remain in the sample in t1, though having experienced long-term 
unemployment in t0 are primarily women that reject starting a family in a context of precari-
ous employment. In contrast, among French women, long-term unemployment probably initi-
ates a detachment from the labour market that results in a latent diffusion process into moth-
erhood, rather than an immediate retreat from the labour force.
  
Additionally, estimates have addressed the role of the number of unemployment episodes a 
person experienced during the last five years. This indicator however did not show any sig-46                                                                      
 
nificant impact on the propensity to opt for starting a family
35. Considering this finding and 
the comparatively weak impact of the experience of previous long-term unemployment, the 
estimates suggest that the experience of instability and precariousness in one’s work career 
appears to be limited in causing a sustained impact on family formation rationales. Instead, 
rather the current experience of occupational insecurity among women tends to support ad hoc 
considerations of combining joblessness with the transition to parenthood. French women 
however deviate from this pattern. For them, a detachment from the labour market appears to 
be a lasting process, while current experiences of occupational insecurity obviously play a 
smaller role than in the rest of the observed countries. This interpretation is consistent with 
the fact that French women face few incentives to combine unemployment with the transition 
to motherhood, as culturally embedded norms of female care are weak, and as social policy 
support encourages a parallel combination of work and family. Perhaps this institutional con-
text also enables women to plan their fertility to a greater extent than in Germany or the UK. 
Yet, the suggested context of a latent detachment from the labour force due to occupational 
insecurities among French women requires closer investigation. This issue would be a fruitful 
subject for future research. Until then, the suggested relation remains somewhat speculative. 
Additional factors in the context of precarious employment that have been tested include 
part-time employment
36, fixed term contracts, as well as self- and public employment
35. Part-
time employment and working under a temporary contract is assumed to signal an incomplete 
integration into the labour force and insecure career prospects (see Kurz 2002; Kim & Kurz 
2003). Yet, the empirical investigations did not provide convincing evidence in this direction. 
Though both part-time work and fixed term contracts showed clear negative patterns with re-
spect to starting a family for both men and women in all countries, none of these contexts are 
statistically significant, except for a weak and instable effect of fixed term contracts for Ger-
man women. Also public employment, which usually should guarantee a higher degree of re-
liability  and  regard  for  parental  needs  does  not  provide  any  stable  results.  Only  self-
employment among men in the UK and in France shows clearer signs of being supportive of 
starting a family. Though this evidence is surprising at first glance, as self-employed persons 
 
                                                            
 
35   Due to the limited explanatory power, the mentioned variables were included in the estimates but have been 
omitted in the displayed results on p.57ff. 
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are  usually  expected  to  have  a  high  workload  and  require  flexible  time  budgets,  self-
employment also relates to a sound establishment in a business context, thus offering reliable 
prospects for financially supporting a family.  
Unemployment and Educational Attainment
37 
I have argued that the impact of unemployment should vary with individual educational at-
tainment, thus affecting the cost of labour market absence. Model III, which considers interac-
tion effects between educational/vocational attainment (ISCED) and unemployment, barely 
shows any signs of an association between unemployment and family formation across educa-
tional groups among men. Only Finnish men with a medium level of educational attainment 
(ISCED 3) have a slightly reduced propensity to opt for becoming a father, the significance 
level, however, is rather low. In contrast, among women, there is clear evidence of a differen-
tial impact of unemployment across educational groups. Generally, higher educated women 
(ISCED 5-7, tertiary, partially academic education) show no increased likelihood to start a 
family during unemployment. As theoretically argued, women with profound skill endow-
ments obviously focus on a labour market reintegration in order to avoid a depreciation of 
their human capital investments. This applies across all of the observed countries, and hence 
regardless of differences in work-family compatibility due to welfare state orientations.  
However,  women  in  Finland,  Germany,  and  the  UK  with  mid-  to  lower  educa-
tional/vocational attainment show an increased probability to place the transition to parent-
hood within an unemployment episode. In Germany and the UK, this impact is most pro-
nounced among women with lower levels of education. These women combine adverse occu-
pational prospects with a limited threat of human capital depreciation due to their already low 
level of skill endowments. Moreover, the UK and Germany are also the two countries that 
combine the highest opportunity costs of parenthood with prevalent traditional gender role as-
criptions. Hence, it is obviously women with comparatively bleak labour market prospects in 
contexts of institutionally and culturally mediated work family incompatibilities that decide 
for a first child while being unemployed. Yet, it should be noted that Finnish women (signifi-
 
                                                            
 
37   It should be noted that the ISCED indicator (see OECD 2001), applied in the ECHP in order to achieve cross-
national comparability in educational levels, still suffers from a limited comparability of educational certificates 
across countries (ISCED 0-2 = secondary schooling; ISCED 3 = upper secondary schooling & vocational edu-
cation; ISCED5-7 = third level, i.e. higher vocational and academic education). 48                                                                      
 
cant impact of unemployment & medium level education) generally can rely on a higher insti-
tutional support of combining work and motherhood. However, given the deep recession dur-
ing the 1990s, the experience of unemployment among mid-level educated women
38 most 
likely signalled severe difficulties in regaining a job, thus nourishing rationales to start a fam-
ily. 
The Partner Model (IV) 
The view on partner characteristics allows for a consideration of the way in which the eco-
nomic backing of a partner might compensate for the experience of occupational insecurities. 
Moreover, this consideration also highlights contexts in which one partner might aim at eco-
nomic independence, particularly by trying to return to the labour market when unemployed, 
instead of focusing on a homemaker role. Importantly, the pronounced impact of female un-
employment and inactivity in Finland, Germany, and the UK remains well in place, after tak-
ing into account partner information such as income level and educational attainment. A view 
of the partner’s unemployment provides a picture that corresponds with the results derived 
from  individual  unemployment:  This  context  only  shows  a  statistically  significant  level 
among men, that is, only the (female) unemployment of wives increases the aptitude to have a 
child. Again, French women show an exception to this rule. That is, in the partner model (IV) 
longer unemployment of wives of French men does not show any significant impact. It can be 
speculated  that  this  is  both  a  reflection  of  the  close  labour  market  attachment  of  French 
women, as well as an indicator of an urge to avoid a regress to traditional family roles and 
economic dependence, particularly in a cultural context where a focus on maternal roles pro-
vides fewer chances of acquiring social esteem.  
With respect to the duration of a partnership, it was speculated that a longer duration fos-
ters reciprocity and mutual trust, and thus serves to restrict the perceived risk of abandonment 
and the significant other exploiting his/her economically superior position. While the results 
should be interpreted with caution as only marital duration could be considered, the evidence 
across all four countries for both women and men is widely consistent in suggesting that pri-
marily the transition to marriage is crucial in fostering family formation rationales, rather than 
 
                                                            
 
38   Lower educated women in Finland show no increased likelihood of family formation during unemployment. 
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the duration of the partnership. In fact the likelihood to start a family increases with the tran-
sition to marriage but then declines with marital duration. 
The Cross-National Model (Model V) 
A final set of estimates (Model V) summarizes the analysis of key indicators in two cross-
nationally comparative models for men and for women. Interaction effects distinguish differ-
ent measures of unemployment by country. The results of these unemployment indicators are 
widely consistent with the country-specific estimates. In this context, male unemployment 
shows no significant effects on the aptitude to start a family in any of the four countries after 
controlling for income, education, and partner characteristics. This does not necessarily con-
tradict  the  often-stressed  assumption  that  labour  market  related  insecurities  hamper  male 
breadwinner qualities, and thus nourish the postponement of fertility transitions. However, 
under male unemployment, the imminent effect of reduced financial backing plays a key role. 
The deviation from the traditional norm of an economically potent household head certainly still 
exerts a negative impact on the transition to fatherhood in most societies. There is still a domi-
nant norm that family formation requires men to pass a certain threshold of economic reliability, 
guaranteeing breadwinner capabilities (see Oppenheimer 1994: 322). Yet, where the decline in 
income is compensated by welfare state support, by occupational prospects due to high skill in-
vestments, and by the backing of a female earner, the negative impact of unemployment is no 
longer dominant in family formation choices. That is, where personal and institutional arrange-
ments are capable of compensating for the economic setbacks of male unemployment, this occu-
pational hardship does not appear to signal persistently reduced breadwinner qualities.  
Moreover, the view of men in the UK supports the view that the status loss due to unem-
ployment might be compensated for by becoming a father (for this line of reasoning see Tölke 
& Diewald 2003). The occupational status loss due to unemployment is particularly extensive 
in a liberal market economy, where participation in gainful employment is crucial for social 
recognition, and thus for self-esteem. Compensating for this status decline with a focus on a 
family role might be an option among men who have been profoundly discouraged in their at-
tempts to regain a job. For them, the low price of time might encourage a participation in pa-
rental responsibilities, thus disburdening the woman and increasing the probability of family 
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formation. However, a reversal of traditional gender roles that are still prevalent in the UK is 
perhaps a daring assumption, particularly given that the outlined effect did not prove to be 
very stable. 
Among women, a positive impact of unemployment and economic inactivity on the likeli-
hood to start a family is salient. The effect is most pronounced among women in the UK, who 
have been unemployed for a longer period. They show a 2.4 times higher likelihood to opt for 
having a child. If these women report economic inactivity – which was stressed as an indica-
tor of discouragement in job-search activities – the likelihood is even 4 times as high as 
among full-time working women. In Germany, a slightly weaker effect of longer unemploy-
ment (a 74% increased probability) provides a picture that otherwise widely resembles the 
situation in the UK. Yet, there is no significant effect of economic inactivity in Germany. This 
perhaps is a consequence of sustained unemployment support that retains a link to the labour 
market by encouraging job-search activities, which makes a self-perception of being economi-
cally inactive unlikely. 
The findings for Finland were unexpected. Even a rather short duration of unemployment 
increases the likelihood of starting a family by the factor 2.3. This widely resembles the situa-
tion in the strong breadwinner countries of Germany and the UK, and clearly distinguishes 
Finland from the French context, where women show a close labour market attachment and a 
high reluctance to start a family during unemployment. These results are surprising, as the 
Finnish welfare state shows the highest performance in encouraging egalitarian gender roles, 
in protecting from life course risks, and in supporting the reconciliation of work and family 
roles for women. Hence, the incentive of reducing opportunity costs by combining unem-
ployment and the transition to parenthood should clearly be reduced in Finland. There is 
strong evidence that this fertility behaviour is closely related to the recession and labour mar-
ket crisis Finland experienced during the early 1990s. Obviously, the adverse labour market 
conditions had a lasting impact on the perception of occupational prospects and insecurities, 
thus fostering family formation as a focus beyond occupational activity. Nevertheless, these 
results also raise some questions of whether the institutional arrangement in Finland is indeed 
doing so well in alleviating the burdens on women that result from combining occupational 
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7)      Summary & Conclusion 
Among men, unemployment hampers family formation. This context, however, is essentially 
related to the imminent effects of a reduced financial backing, whereas I did not find any con-
sistent evidence that unemployment persistently signals reduced breadwinner qualities beyond 
the direct economic setbacks. Among women, unemployment encourages the transition to par-
enthood if occupational prospects are bleak, or if a close link to the labour market has been 
broken. This is reflected in the finding that particularly longer periods of unemployment and 
subsequent economic inactivity speed up the transition to parenthood. Moreover, I find a pro-
nounced impact of unemployment among women with a lower educational and vocational at-
tainment. These findings are particularly pronounced in Germany and the UK, two countries 
that leave the burden of reconciling occupational engagement and parenthood to women. Im-
portantly, these two countries combine contradictory institutional arrangements by nourishing 
occupational aspirations, particularly among younger women, while traditional gender roles 
are still culturally embedded and institutionally reproduced – for example by neglect of ma-
ternity protection and support (UK), strict maternal carer norms (Germany), and by an under-
developed supply of public childcare (in both Germany and the UK).  
The consequence of these contradictory institutional arrangements in market (i.e. individ-
ual) oriented and in family oriented institutions (see McDonald 2000) are high opportunity 
costs of parenthood. These opportunity costs are further increased by the necessity of estab-
lishing an autonomous and independent economic position, last but not least, in order to com-
pensate for limited institutional protection from life course risks and economic hardships. 
This leads to a strong female labour market attachment. Against this background, only longer 
unemployment episodes that have already hampered labour market integration show a positive 
impact on to the likelihood to start a family. 
The view on the UK and Germany supports the assumption that family formation in these 
countries is closely related to two major factors: First, high burdens of combining familial and 
occupational roles, particularly among women; and second, the implicit norm to first integrate 
into the labour market in order to transfer educational investments into safe occupational 
status positions. This context results in family formation during unemployment being a prom-
ising option, particularly among lower educated women, who frequently already depend on 52                                                                      
 
support from a male earner, whose partner relations are thus more traditional, and who face 
bleak labour market prospects compared to women with higher skill endowments. In contrast, 
higher educated women are reluctant to place the transition to parenthood within an unem-
ployment episode. Rather, these women focus on a reintegration into the labour market obvi-
ously in order to avoid a reduction to the role of the sole homemaker, which would not only 
lead to a depreciation of their human capital investments and hamper their career options, but 
which would also establish economic and social dependence from a breadwinner. 
Except for the findings for Finland, which are biased by a severe labour market crisis that 
hampered occupational prospects, the evidence suggests a close labour market attachment of 
women in Germany and the UK, and particularly in France. While family formation during 
unemployment is obviously a promising option due to the low price of time among German 
and British women, women in these countries only opt accordingly if a close link to the labour 
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8)      Appendix: 
(A) Additional Structural Indicators 













Source:   SourceOECD Employment and Labour Statistics, (2007). Online database. 
 



















Source:   SourceOECD Employment and Labour Statistics, (2007). Online database. 
Note:  Values for Germany before 1991 apply to West Germany only. 
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(B) Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 3: Sample of Respondents – Selected Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics  France  Finland  Germany  UK 
(all values in percent)  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Birth Cohorts         
1955-1964  18.9  14.5  21.7  16.5  21.8  17.7  27.2  21.6 
1965-1974  47.5  44.6  31.7  27.0  47.1  43.6  43.1  41.9 
1975-1983  33.7  41.0  46.6  56.5  31.1  38.7  29.6  36.5 
Partnership Status   
Single / Living Apart Together  74.5  69.1  68.8  61.2  68.4  58.3  60.8  55.0 
Consensual Union  12.9  14.8  16.8  20.4  12.6  15.2  14.8  15.7 
Married  12.6  16.1  14.5  18.4  19.0  26.3  24.3  29.3 
Duration of Marriage up to 1Y.  2.2  2.6  1.6  1.9  2.4  3.1  2.8  3.1 
Duration of Marriage 2-3 Years  4.8  5.8  5.3  6.2  6.1  7.7  8.1  8.7 
Duration of Mar. 4 Years & More  4.8  6.9  6.6  9.3  8.9  13.7  11.7  15.4 
Educational Attainment     
ISCED levels 0-2 (lower 2
nd Lvl.)  26.5  21.4  32.0  33.2  32.2  32.7  34.9  32.6 
ISCED level 3  (upper 2
nd Lvl.)  34.2  35.4  52.5  42.0  52.1  52.1  15.1  16.2 
ISCED levels 5-7 (3
rd Lvl. Ed.)  21.0  26.6  15.4  24.4  12.8  10.5  46.5  48.9 
Activity Status       
Full-time & Permanent Contr.  35.6  25.3  30.4  20.7  41.7  34.1  52.5  43.8 
Full-time & Public Employment  7.2  8.3  6.1  7.1  9.0  14.8  9.6  15.8 
Full-time & Fixed Term Contract  6.9  5.3  6.4  8.6  4.7  4.1  3.1  3.2 
Part-time Employed  2.5  5.5  3.0  5.1  4.3  6.5  3.3  6.5 
Self-Employed  3.1  1.1  8.1  2.4  3.6  1.3  7.1  2.8 
In Education/ Apprenticeship  27.7  38.1  26.3  39.4  24.8  28.8  13.8  18.7 
Economically Inactive  2.7  2.6  0.7  1.1  0.5  2.5  2.3  3.4 
Retired / Other / Missing  5.6  4.2  10.1  8.5  5.1  3.0  1.9  2.1 
Unemployment     
Unemployed (UE)  8.8  9.6  8.9  7.4  6.4  5.1  6.4  3.7 
Short-term UE (1-4 months)  3.2  3.4  3.4  3.4  2.4  1.9  2.4  1.7 
Longer UE    (> 4months)  5.6  6.2  5.5  4.0  4.0  3.2  4.0  1.9 
Long-term UE during last 5 Yr.?  8.2  7.8  12.7  7.3  6.1  4.9  11.1  4.6 
           Partner Context   
ISCED       Levels 0-2  24.0  28.6  12.9  14.7  14.9  14.1  30.5  26.2 
Level 3  36.0  34.6  46.5  56.1  67.5  60.1  13.1  13.1 
Levels 5-7 (3
rd Lvl. Edu.)  30.1  26.0  40.4  28.9  16.2  24.5  54.9  58.6 
Relative Income: Similar  Level  29.8  29.3  24.0  23.1  39.2  38.9  35.8  38.4 
Traditional (♂ 1/3 above ♀)  46.8  46.6  45.5  41.9  42.9  41.3  45.8  39.1 
Fem. Main Earner (♀1/3>♂)  13.5  14.1  16.5  19.1  13.8  15.4  12.6  16.8 
Both not working  6.3  6.8  9.6  11.2  2.9  3.1  3.5  3.6 
Employment:   Partner Inactive  4.5  1.2  1.0  0.4  3.9  0.7  5.9  1.3 
Partner Unemployed  12.1  6.7  9.5  7.8  5.1  4.8  2.7  4.2 
                  n of person-months  155.211  127.291  77.893  62.872  166.077  133.783  120.035  98.510 
n of cases  2.851  2.465  1.635  1.389  2.754  2.372  2.177  1.861 
n of cases w. Partner(Model IV)  1.198  1.208  782  786  1.321  1.356  1.183  1.103 
n of births (backdated) ‘94-2000  579  632  249  250  547  588  456  480 
Source:  ECHP 1994-2001 (author’s calculations). 
Note:   Sample description reflects person-months of observations (i.e. repeated records for each observed  
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(C)   Piecewise-Constant Exponential Hazard Estimates on First-Birth Risk 
Model Description: 
Model I:   Duration of unemployment, prior to the month of decision for parenthood  
(tbirth – 10 months). Binary coding of:  
Short-term (up to 4 months of continuous unemployment); 
Mid-term (more than four months of continuous unemployment). 
All adult respondents of cohorts 1955-1983 
Model II:  Duration of unemployment, prior to the month of decision for parenthood  
(tbirth – 10 months). Unemployment duration measured as part of the employment 
status with full-time employment as reference category. Additional covariates (net-
income, ISCED, partnerships status, etc. Long-term unemployment during the last 
5 years, unemployment rate (nuts1 level ).  
All adult respondents of cohorts 1955-1983 
Model III: Interaction effects of unemployment by education (at tbirth – 10 months).  
Identical to Model II. Exception: Unemployment duration excluded in favour of in-
teraction effects of unemployment by educational attainment (ISCED). 
All adult respondents of cohorts 1955-1983 
Model IV: Partner Model (at tbirth – 10 months).  
Identical to Model II. Exception: Covariates on partner added, incl. partner’s in-
come, partner’s unemployment/inactivity, partner’s education, relative income. 
Only couples with partner being panel respondent, cohorts 1955-1983. 
Model V:  Cross national partner Model (at tbirth – 10 months).  
Identical to Model IV. Date pooled across country. 
Only couples with partner being panel respondent, cohorts 1955-1983. 
Note:     Models I through IV are based on separate estimates by gender for each country; 
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Table 4:  Determinants of First-Birth Risk - Piecewise Constant Estimates for France by Gender (note: this table continued on next page) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Baseline Hazard  (Effects apply to Hazard / Month)             
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
16 to 21 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
22 to 26 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
27 to 33 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
33 to 38 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
39 to 45 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Ever Worked? 
    1.51  1.33  1.51  1.36  0.95  1.09 
  Yes (1)      (0.61)  (0.29)  (0.61)  (0.30)  (0.38)  (0.26) 
Activity Status Reference: Full-time Employed w. Permanet Contract (Omitted Categories: Full-time w. Fixed Term Contract / FT+Public Employ. / Self Employment) 
    0.78  1.17  0.78  1.17  0.76  1.13  Part-Time Employed 
    (0.25)  (0.17)  (0.25)  (0.17)  (0.25)  (0.17) 
    0.50  0.41  0.49  0.42  0.46  0.35  In Education/Apprentice 
    (0.18)**  (0.10)***  (0.17)**  (0.10)***  (0.19)*  (0.10)*** 
    0.48  1.71  0.50  1.73  0.87  1.55  Economically Inactive 
    (0.30)  (0.40)**  (0.31)  (0.41)**  (0.54)  (0.39)* 
0.87  1.23  1.32  0.99      1.50  0.95  Short-Term UE (1-4 months) 
(0.22)  (0.24)  (0.33)  (0.20)      (0.49)  (0.21) 
0.40  0.81  1.04  0.79      1.26  0.69  Longer UE    (5 or more mo.) 
(0.11)***  (0.14)  (0.30)  (0.15)      (0.43)  (0.15)* 
        1.48  0.76      UE*Lower Educ. (ISCED 0-2) 
        (0.45)  (0.21)     
        0.77  1.03      UE*Mid Education (ISCED 3) 
        (0.32)  (0.23)     
        0.66  0.72      UE*Higer Educ.  (ISCED5-7) 
        (0.40)  (0.19)     
Partners Employment Status             
            1.03  1.17  Unemployed / Inactive  
            (0.14)  (0.27) 
Long-term UE (>12Months) During the last 5 Years? Reference: Not Long-Term UE during last 5 years  
    0.71  1.25  0.69  1.22  0.81  1.25  Yes (1) 
    (0.15)*  (0.16)*  (0.15)*  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.18) 
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Table 4 continued… 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Regional UE Rate             
    1.02  1.03  1.02  1.03  1.03  1.04 
    (Nuts1 Level) 
    (0.02)  (0.02)*  (0.02)  (0.02)*  (0.02)  (0.02)** 
Education Reference: 2
nd Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 3)           
    1.12  1.07  1.08  1.11  1.13  1.03  Less than 2
nd Stage of Secon-
dary Education     (ISCED 0-2)      (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
    0.84  1.07  0.84  1.11  0.83  1.16  Third Level Education 
                            (ISCED 5-7)      (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
Individual Income (Euro/Month PPP adjusted)             
    1.12  1.08  1.12  1.08  1.09  1.12  Net Income, Work & Assets 
    (0.03)***  (0.05)  (0.03)***  (0.05)  (0.03)**  (0.06)** 
    3.47  5.96  3.42  5.96  3.35  6.63  Public Transfers  
(excl. Unemployment Benefits)      (1.22)***  (1.34)***  (1.20)***  (1.34)***  (1.22)***  (1.70)*** 
Type of relationship Reference: Single / Living Apart Together           
    21.47  6.48  21.37  6.49  Consensual Union 
    (5.47)***  (1.20)***  (5.44)***  (1.20)*** 
Reference: Consensual Union 
    47.18  10.29  47.29  10.33  2.16  1.57  Married for up to 1 Year 
    (12.81)***  (2.16)***  (12.80)***  (2.16)***  (0.33)***  (0.26)*** 
    55.36  16.16  54.97  16.20  2.52  2.33  Married 2 to 3 Years 
    (14.69)***  (3.22)***  (14.57)***  (3.23)***  (0.27)***  (0.26)*** 
    35.69  10.18  35.52  10.17  1.66  1.49  Married 4 Years or more 
    (9.73)***  (2.15)***  (9.66)***  (2.15)***  (0.22)***  (0.20)*** 
Partnerinformation (Reference categories as above)             
            0.95  1.10  P. Education  (ISCED 0-2) 
            (0.13)  (0.13) 
            1.14  0.85  P. Education   (ISCED 5-7) 
            (0.12)  (0.10) 
    1.14  1.13  1.14  1.13  1.15  1.09  P. Net Income  
(Euro/Month PPP adjusted)      (0.04)***  (0.02)***  (0.04)***  (0.02)***  (0.05)***  (0.03)** 
Relative Income Reference: Equal Income Level             
            1.02  1.14  Traditional   (♂ 1/3 above ♀) 
            (0.11)  (0.13) 
            0.76  0.72  Fem. Main Earner (♀1/3>♂) 
            (0.14)  (0.12)* 
                  n of Person-Months =  152429  124894  152429  124894  152429  124894  38752  38521 
n of Subjects / Events =  2851 / 579  2465 / 632  2851 / 579  2465 / 632  2851 / 579  2465 / 632  1198 / 551  1208 / 556 
Log Pseudolikelihood  =  -212.28  171.1  352.14  326.82  353.91  327.25  456.01  491.24 
Wald Chi
2 =  15650.00  15991.52  11739.73  12878.16  11771.69  12859.51  10011.78  9423.06 
Source:  ECHP 1994 to 2001 (author’s calculations).                          Significance levels based on p < 0.10 (*), p < 0.05 (**) and p < 0.01 (***).                                                                                                                           59 
 
Table 5:  Determinants of First Birth Risk - Piecewise Constant Estimates for Finland by Gender (note: this table continued on next page) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Baseline Hazard  (Effects apply to Hazard / Month)             
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
16 to 21 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  22 to 26 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  27 to 33 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  33 to 38 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  39 to 45 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Ever Worked?                 
    1.29  0.91  1.27  0.93  0.50  0.78    Yes (1) 
    (0.72)  (0.24)  (0.71)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.22) 
Activity Status Reference: Full-time Employed w. Permanet Contract (Omitted Categories: Full-time w. Fixed Term Contract / FT+Public Employ. / Self Employment) 
    1.34  0.74  1.34  0.74  1.30  0.66  Part-Time Employed 
    (0.45)  (0.23)  (0.45)  (0.23)  (0.50)  (0.23) 
    0.50  0.77  0.50  0.76  0.54  0.80  In Education/Apprentice 
    (0.16)**  (0.17)  (0.16)**  (0.18)  (0.20)*  (0.21) 
    omitted  2.82  omitted  2.82  omitted  2.82  Economically Inactive 
      (1.15)**    (1.16)**    (1.29)** 
0.48  2.78  0.50  2.29      0.26  2.29  Short-Term UE (1-4 months) 
(0.24)  (0.61)***  (0.26)  (0.57)***      (0.19)*  (0.62)*** 
0.48  1.26  0.83  1.23      0.73  1.22  Longer UE    (5 or more mo.) 
(0.18)*  (0.37)  (0.32)  (0.41)      (0.32)  (0.45) 
        1.03  1.77      UE*Lower Educ. (ISCED 0-2) 
        (0.60)  (0.83)     
        0.36  1.93      UE*Mid Education (ISCED 3) 
        (0.19)*  (0.64)**     
        1.54  1.70      UE*Higher Educ. (ISCED5-7) 
        (0.81)  (0.55)     
Partners Employment Status 
            2.54  0.67  Unemployed / Inactive  
            (0.53)***  (0.24) 
Long-term UE (>12Months) During the last 5 Years? Reference: Not Long-Term UE during last 5 years 
    0.82  0.93  0.82  0.85  0.73  0.83  Yes (1) 
    (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.21) 
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 Table 5 continued… 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Regional UE Rate             
    1.02  1.04  1.02  1.04  1.02  1.04      (Nuts1 Level) 
    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Education Reference: 2
nd Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 3)           
    0.88  1.76  0.81  1.78  0.98  1.45  Less than 2
nd Stage of Secon-
dary Education     (ISCED 0-2)      (0.20)  (0.38)***  (0.20)  (0.42)**  (0.26)  (0.33) 
    0.85  1.42  0.80  1.46  0.83  1.52  Third Level Education 
                            (ISCED 5-7)      (0.15)  (0.24)**  (0.14)  (0.26)**  (0.16)  (0.27)** 
Individual Income (Euro/Month PPP adjusted)             
    1.11  1.17  1.11  1.17  1.09  1.17  Net Income, Work & Assets 
    (0.07)  (0.06)***  (0.07)  (0.06)***  (0.10)  (0.06)*** 
    2.44  1.51  2.44  1.58  2.34  1.14  Public Transfers  
(excl. Unemployment Benefits)      (0.83)***  (0.99)  (0.83)***  (1.02)  (0.88)**  (0.92) 
Type of relationship Reference: Single / Living Apart Together           
    2.94  8.97  2.94  8.99  Consensual Union 
    (0.90)***  (2.97)***  (0.90)***  (2.96)*** 
Reference: Consensual Union 
    17.55  42.66  17.62  42.90  7.03  5.17  Married for up to 1 Year 
    (5.59)***  (14.79)***  (5.57)***  (14.88)***  (1.77)***  (1.29)*** 
    8.98  24.00  8.82  24.13  3.25  2.76  Married 2 to 3 Years 
    (2.74)***  (8.35)***  (2.68)***  (8.36)***  (0.68)***  (0.56)*** 
    5.97  20.57  5.95  20.58  2.38  2.47  Married 4 Years or more 
    (1.90)***  (7.50)***  (1.89)***  (7.48)***  (0.53)***  (0.58)*** 
Partnerinformation (Reference categories as above)             
            1.10  1.23  P. Education  (ISCED 0-2) 
            (0.29)  (0.30) 
            1.44  0.83  P. Education   (ISCED 5-7) 
            (0.25)**  (0.15) 
    1.18  1.15  1.18  1.15  1.19  1.15  P. Net Income  
(Euro/Month PPP adjusted)      (0.09)**  (0.07)**  (0.09)**  (0.07)**  (0.11)*  (0.08)** 
Relative Income Reference: Equal Income Level             
            1.06  1.10  Traditional   (♂ 1/3 above ♀) 
            (0.23)  (0.23) 
            1.10  0.89  Fem. Main Earner (♀1/3>♂) 
            (0.30)  (0.23) 
                  n of Person-Months =  76413  61651  76413  61651  76413  61651  23772  23833 
n of Subjects / Events =  1635 / 249  1389 / 250  1635 / 249  1389 / 250  1635 / 249  1389 / 250  782 / 219  786 / 227 
Log Pseudolikelihood  =  -129.11  -111.84  65.35  70.55  67.20  69.07  147.29  129.98 
Wald Chi
2 =  7010.22  6619.78  15563.11  8788.73  15780.84  9575.46  8664.15  7078.84 
Source:  ECHP 1994 to 2001 (author’s calculations).                          Significance levels based on p < 0.10 (*), p < 0.05 (**) and p < 0.01 (***). 
                                                                                                                           61 
 
Table 6:    Determinants of First-Birth Risk - Piecewise Constant Estimates for Germany by Gender (note: this table continued on next page) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Baseline Hazard  (Effects apply to Hazard / Month)             
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
16 to 21 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  22 to 26 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  27 to 33 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  33 to 38 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  39 to 45 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Ever Worked?                 
    1.53  1.81  1.53  1.79  1.21  1.17    Yes (1) 
    (0.69)  (0.52)**  (0.70)  (0.52)**  (0.68)  (0.41) 
Activity Status Reference: Full-time Employed w. Permanent Contract (Omitted Categories: Full-time w. Fixed Term Contract / FT+Public Employ. / Self-Employment) 
    0.68  0.91  0.68  0.91  0.74  0.97  Part-Time Employed 
    (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.20) 
    0.84  0.54  0.85  0.54  1.02  0.68  In Education/Apprentice 
    (0.20)  (0.11)***  (0.20)  (0.11)***  (0.30)  (0.15)* 
    omitted  1.53  omitted  1.54  omitted  1.21  Economically Inactive 
      (0.33)**    (0.33)**    (0.31) 
0.58  1.23  0.69  1.28      0.61  1.22  Short-Term UE (1-4 months) 
(0.22)  (0.35)  (0.27)  (0.38)      (0.27)  (0.41) 
0.65  1.82  1.11  2.30      0.87  2.01  Longer UE    (5 or more mo.) 
(0.17)*  (0.33)***  (0.29)  (0.50)***      (0.29)  (0.54)*** 
        0.88  1.99      UE*Lower Educ. (ISCED 0-2) 
        (0.33)  (0.54)**     
        0.98  1.74      UE*Mid Education (ISCED 3) 
        (0.29)  (0.41)**     
        0.47  1.96      UE*Higher Educ. (ISCED5-7) 
        (0.48)  (1.08)     
Partners Employment Status             
            1.88  0.74   Unemployed / Inactive 
            (0.29)***  (0.22) 
Long-term UE (>12Months) During the last 5 Years? Reference: Not Long-Term UE during last 5 years 
    0.82  0.80  0.86  0.87  0.88  0.64  Yes (1) 
    (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.20) 
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Table 6 continued… 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Regional UE Rate             
    0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.98      (Nuts1 Level) 
    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Education Reference: 2
nd Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 3)           
    1.28  1.48  1.29  1.46  1.34  1.40  Less than 2
nd Stage of Secon-
dary Education     (ISCED 0-2)      (0.16)*  (0.17)***  (0.17)**  (0.18)***  (0.18)**  (0.18)** 
    1.11  0.93  1.12  0.92  1.22  0.94  Third Level Education 
                            (ISCED 5-7)      (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.14) 
Individual Income (Euro/Month PPP adjusted)             
    1.11  1.27  1.11  1.27  1.10  1.26  Net Income, Work & Assets 
    (0.05)**  (0.09)***  (0.05)**  (0.09)***  (0.06)*  (0.08)*** 
    1.03  13.58  1.03  13.53  0.63  18.16  Public Transfers  
(excl. Unemployment Benefits)      (0.58)  (4.51)***  (0.58)  (4.49)***  (0.40)  (7.22)*** 
Type of relationship Reference: Single / Living Apart Together           
    2.84  1.70  2.84  1.70  Consensual Union 
    (0.72)***  (0.36)**  (0.72)***  (0.36)** 
Reference: Consensual Union 
    20.81  9.56  20.67  9.56  7.87  6.00  Married for up to 1 Year 
    (4.86)***  (2.01)***  (4.82)***  (2.01)***  (1.52)***  (1.16)*** 
    17.12  9.98  17.13  9.92  6.54  6.25  Married 2 to 3 Years 
    (4.06)***  (2.02)***  (4.06)***  (2.00)***  (1.11)***  (1.05)*** 
    12.97  7.26  12.95  7.25  4.95  4.77  Married 4 Years or more 
    (3.11)***  (1.50)***  (3.11)***  (1.50)***  (0.86)***  (0.81)*** 
Partner Information (Reference categories as above)             
            1.33  1.38  P. Education  (ISCED 0-2) 
            (0.17)**  (0.18)** 
            0.83  1.09  P. Education   (ISCED 5-7) 
            (0.12)  (0.15) 
    1.12  1.07  1.12  1.07  1.25  1.11  P. Net Income  
(Euro/Month PPP adjusted)      (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.09)***  (0.06)* 
Relative Income Reference: Equal Income Level             
            1.16  1.04  Traditional   (♂ 1/3 above ♀) 
            (0.14)  (0.14) 
            1.14  1.06  Fem. Main Earner (♀1/3>♂) 
            (0.25)  (0.20) 
                  n of Person-Months =  163853  131925  163853  131925  163853  131925  51642  54822 
n of Subjects / Events =  2754 / 547  2372 / 588  2754 / 547  2372 / 588  2754 / 547  2372 / 588  1321 / 491  1356 / 484 
Log Pseudolikelihood  =  -313.57  -286.86  130.62  74.07  130.81  72.74  282.84  256.33 
Wald Chi
2 =  15580.61  15740.94  12711.16  13745.21  12733.39  15094.11  9490.44  9326.65 
 Source:  ECHP 1994 to 2001 (author’s calculations).                          Significance levels based on p < 0.10 (*), p < 0.05 (**) and p < 0.01 (***).                                                                                                                           63 
 
Table 7:   Determinants of First-Birth Risk - Piecewise Constant Estimates for the UK by Gender (note: this table continued on next page) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Baseline Hazard  (Effects apply to Hazard / Month)             
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
16 to 21 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  22 to 26 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  27 to 33 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  33 to 38 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  39 to 45 Years 
(0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Ever Worked? 
    0.74  1.35  0.82  1.30  0.60  0.93    Yes (1) 
    (0.31)  (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.29) 
Activity Status Reference: Full-time Employed w. Permanent Contract (Omitted Categories: Full-time w. Fixed Term Contract / FT+Public Employ. / Self-Employment) 
    0.97  1.01  0.98  1.01  1.06  1.15  Part-Time Employed 
    (0.28)  (0.20)  (0.29)  (0.20)  (0.32)  (0.24) 
    0.18  0.37  0.19  0.36  0.44  0.46  In Education/Apprentice 
    (0.11)***  (0.11)***  (0.12)***  (0.11)***  (0.29)  (0.20)* 
    1.24  6.04  1.30  5.97  2.28  6.31  Economically Inactive 
    (0.47)  (1.16)***  (0.49)  (1.15)***  (1.00)*  (1.36)*** 
1.28  1.11  1.18  1.27      1.46  1.40  Short-Term UE (1-4 months) 
(0.37)  (0.40)  (0.39)  (0.48)      (0.62)  (0.62) 
0.79  2.26  0.68  3.00      1.08  2.59  Longer UE    (5 or more mo.) 
(0.22)  (0.56)***  (0.21)  (0.85)***      (0.39)  (1.01)** 
        1.08  2.31      UE*Lower Educ. (ISCED 0-2) 
        (0.33)  (0.76)**     
        0.65  1.39      UE*Mid Education (ISCED 3) 
        (0.50)  (1.02)     
        0.62  1.66      UE*Higher Educ. (ISCED5-7) 
        (0.31)  (0.66)     
Partners Employment Status             
            3.73  1.54  Unemployed / Inactive  
            (0.65)***  (0.40)* 
Long-term UE (>12Months) During the last 5 Years? Reference: Not Long-Term UE during last 5 years  
    1.01  0.94  0.97  1.02  0.98  0.74  Yes (1) 
    (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.19)  (0.20) 
                                        Table continued on next page… 
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Table 7 continued… 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b  haz.  b 
Regional UE Rate             
    1.00  1.02  1.00  1.02  1.00  1.01      (Nuts1 Level) 
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Education Reference: 2
nd Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 3)           
    1.20  1.34  1.16  1.32  1.40  1.28  Less than 2
nd Stage of Secon-
dary Education     (ISCED 0-2)      (0.20)  (0.21)*  (0.20)  (0.21)*  (0.25)*  (0.22) 
    1.07  1.10  1.06  1.10  1.18  1.14  Third Level Education 
                            (ISCED 5-7)      (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.20)  (0.18) 
Individual Income (Euro/Month PPP adjusted)             
    1.01  1.04  1.01  1.04  0.98  1.08  Net Income, Work & Assets 
    (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
    0.91  1.09  0.90  1.09  0.68  0.48  Public Transfers  
(excl. Unemployment Benefits)      (0.30)  (0.41)  (0.33)  (0.41)  (0.33)  (0.26) 
Type of relationship Reference: Single / Living Apart Together           
    9.61  3.09  9.57  3.09  Consensual Union 
    (2.43)***  (0.63)***  (2.42)***  (0.64)*** 
Reference: Consensual Union 
    28.13  8.57  27.56  8.57  2.97  2.58  Married for up to 1 Year 
    (7.45)***  (2.06)***  (7.30)***  (2.07)***  (0.58)***  (0.52)*** 
    25.96  9.75  25.56  9.71  2.85  3.08  Married 2 to 3 Years 
    (6.67)***  (2.05)***  (6.55)***  (2.05)***  (0.42)***  (0.47)*** 
    23.14  6.63  22.77  6.65  2.58  2.21  Married 4 Years or more 
    (6.03)***  (1.46)***  (5.95)***  (1.47)***  (0.38)***  (0.35)*** 
Partner Information (Reference categories as above)           
            1.06  1.24  P. Education  (ISCED 0-2) 
            (0.19)  (0.23) 
            1.05  1.13  P. Education  (ISCED 5-7) 
            (0.17)  (0.19) 
    1.07  1.03  1.07  1.03  1.09  0.94  P. Net Income  
(Euro/Month PPP adjusted)      (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Relative Income Reference: Equal Income Level             
            1.25  1.38  Traditional   (♂ 1/3 above ♀) 
            (0.17)*  (0.20)** 
            1.25  1.04  Fem. Main Earner (♀1/3>♂) 
            (0.26)  (0.21) 
                  n of Person-Months =  117942  96742  117942  96742  117942  96742  46227  43621 
n of Subjects / Events =  2177 / 456  1861 / 480  2177 / 456  1861 / 480  2177 / 456  1861 / 480  1183 / 423  1103 / 408 
Log Pseudolikelihood  =  -247.16  -216.92  94.42  83.67  94.25  81.96  198.76  210.62 
Wald Chi
2 =  13294.98  13136.34  12029.83  13192.69  12016.81  13271.73  8758.21  1.50e+12 
Source:  ECHP 1994 to 2001 (author’s calculations).                          Significance levels based on p < 0.10 (*), p < 0.05 (**) and p < 0.01 (***). 
Table 8:  Determinants of First-Birth Risk - Piecewise Constant Estimates across  
Countries by Gender (note: this table continued on next page) 
  Model V 
All Countries / Couples Only  Men  Women 
  hazard ratio  se  hazard ratio  se 
Baseline Hazard  (Effects apply to Hazard / Month) 
16 to 21 Years  0.01  (0.00)***  0.01  (0.00)*** 
22 to 26 Years  0.00  (0.00)***  0.00  (0.00)*** 
27 to 33 Years  0.00  (0.00)***  0.00  (0.00)*** 
33 to 38 Years  0.00  (0.00)***  0.00  (0.00)*** 
39 to 45 Years  0.00  (0.00)***  0.00  (0.00)*** 
      Ever Worked? (Yes)  0.85  (0.19)  1.00  (0.14) 
Activity Status Reference: Full-time Employed w. Permanent Contract (see above for omitted categories) 
 Part-Time Employment  0.89  (0.15)  1.07  (0.11) 
 In Education/Apprentice  0.72  (0.13)*  0.55  (0.07)*** 
Inactive*France  0.80  (0.49)  2.00  (0.46)*** 
Inactive*UK   (for Finland & German see note below)  1.71  (0.59)  4.00  (0.75)*** 
Short-Term Unemployment (1-4 Months)*France  1.53   (0.43)  1.24  (0.25) 
Short-Term Unemployment (1-4)*Finland  0.38  (0.27)  2.31  (0.52)*** 
Short-Term Unemployment (1-4)*Germany  0.63  (0.26)  0.97  (0.31) 
Short-Term Unemployment (1-4)*UK  1.29  (0.48)  1.23  (0.50) 
Longer Unemployment (5+Months)*France  1.24  (0.41)  0.85  (0.18) 
Longer Unemployment (5+)*Finland  1.13  (0.45)  1.24  (0.41) 
Longer Unemployment (5+)*Germany  0.90  (0.26)  1.74  (0.40)** 
Longer Unemployment (5+)*UK  1.03  (0.32)  2.38  (0.85)** 
Partner Unemployed / Inactive  1.97  (0.16)***  1.05   (0.15) 
Long-term UE (>12Months) During the last 5 Years? Reference: Not Long-Term UE during last 5 years 
Long-Term UE *France  0.98  (0.22)  1.77  (0.24)*** 
Long-Term UE *Finland  0.69  (0.17)  0.90  (0.22) 
Long-Term UE *Germany  0.74  (0.19)  0.57  (0.17)* 
Long-Term UE *UK  1.00  (0.17)  0.61  (0.17)* 
Regional UE Rate (Nuts1)  1.01  (0.01)  1.01  (0.01) 
Education Reference: 2
nd Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 3) 
Less than 2
nd Stage of Secondary Ed.(ISCED 0-2)  1.23  (0.08)***  1.19  (0.08)** 
Third Level Education                       (ISCED 5-7)  0.94  (0.06)  1.14  (0.07)** 
Partner’s Education Reference: (ISCED 3) 
Partner’s Education (ISCED 0-2)  1.07  (0.08)  1.18  (0.08)** 
Partner’s Education (ISCED 5-7)  1.13  0.07)**  0.90  (0.06) 
Individual Income (Euro/Month PPP adjusted) 
Net Income from Work & Assets  1.06  (0.03)*  1.10  (0.04)*** 
Public Transfers (excl. Unemployment Benefits)  1.43  (0.17)***  4.45  (0.77)*** 
Partner’s Net Income from Work & Assets   1.12  (0.03)***  1.07  (0.03)** 
Table continued on next page… 
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Table 7 continued… 
Relative Income Reference: Equal Income Level 
Traditional   (♂ 1/3 above ♀)  1.09  (0.07)  1.10  (0.08)   
Female Main Earner (♀1/3>♂)  1.03  (0.11)  0.90  (0.09)   
Type of relationship Reference: Consensual Union / Unmarried 
Married for up to 1 Year  3.47  (0.31)***  2.76  (0.26)*** 
Married 2 to 3 Years  3.14  (0.22)***  3.08  (0.22)*** 
Married 4 Years or more  2.35  (0.18)***  2.07  (0.16)*** 
Summary Statistics 
n of Person-Months =  160.393  160.797 
n of Subjects / Events =  4.484 / 1.684  4.453 / 1.685 
Log Pseudolikelihood  =  913.04  890.85 
Wald Chi
2 =  32505.56***  31898.14*** 
Source: ECHP 1994 to 2001, (author’s calculations). 
Notes: Significance levels based on p < 0.10 (*), p < 0.05 (**) and p < 0.01 (***). 
Effects for inactivity in Germany and Finland estimated but results omitted due to low n of cases. 
Notes for Table 4 – Table 8: 
(1)  Method: piecewise constant exponential hazard. 
(2)  Estimates controlled for repeated observations (robust standard errors). 
(3)  All estimated chi
2 values significant on basis of p < 0.0001. 
(4)  Dependent variable set at t-10 months from time of birth. 
(5)  Process time measured in months since person’s birth. 
(6)  Considered age span: 16-45 years of age within cohorts 1955-1983 
(7)  No ECHP data for wave 1 and 2 in Finland. 
(8)  Estimated  but  not  displayed  variables include public employment, self-employment, 
fixed-term employment, country of origin, household size & control dummies for cal-
endar year, dummy sets include flag variables for missing values, where necessary. 
(9)  Variable East/West included for Germany, to account for region specific effects. 
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